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…caught naked, in silence, by the gaze of an animal, 
for example, the eyes of a cat, I have trouble, yes, a 
bad time overcoming my embarrassment. 
–Jacques Derrida (2008: 3–4) 
 
A dog’s gaze directed towards me causes me no 
embarrassment.  
–Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2004: 160) 
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INTRODUCTION 
We polish an animal mirror to look for 
ourselves.  
–Donna Haraway (1978: 37) 
 
The basic question which initially motivated this thesis is as follows: “How do 
philosophers1 talk about animals – while they are not specifically talking about 
animals?” The importance and necessity of this question may be cast in doubt. 
For there is a peculiarity, presumptuousness even, in asking about what thinkers 
are not doing – as if they should be doing precisely that –, or what they are not 
doing while doing something else entirely. Thus we must proceed stepwise, and 
begin with certain examples derived from philosophical discourse. 
 Let us begin with three quotations, chosen only somewhat randomly – 
randomly with respect to their content and time of writing, anyway, but mindful 
of their placement in the text from which they are derived. The first quotation is 
the very first paragraph of John Dewey’s Reconstruction in Philosophy: 
 
Man preserves his past experiences. What happened in the past is lived again in 
memory. About what goes on today hangs a cloud of thoughts concerning 
similar things undergone in bygone days. Man lives in a world where each 
occurrence is charged with echoes and reminiscences of what has gone before, 
where each event is a reminder of other things. Hence he lives in a world of 
signs and symbols. […] And all this is because man remembers, preserving and 
recording his experiences. (Dewey 1920: 1) 
 
Here we see the eminent pragmatic thinker putting forth the importance of me-
mory for the conduct of human affairs. The second quote is from Giorgio 
Agamben’s essay “On Potentiality”, from his collection of papers, Potentialities 
(1999). The essay is a thorough investigation of the titular concept, Aristotle’s 
“potentiality”: 
 
If we recall that Aristotle always draws his examples of this potentiality of 
non-Being from the domain of the arts and human knowledge, then we may say 
that human beings, insofar as they know and produce, are those beings who 
exist in the mode of potentiality. Every human power is adynamia, impotentia-
                                                            
1  A note on the concept of “philosophy”: over the course of this thesis I will veer into va-
rious different disciplines within, for the most part, the humanities. None of these disciplines 
are canonically thought of as philosophy proper. As such, philosophy is herein not defined 
institutionally or historically in a textbook-like fashion. Instead, within the purview of this 
thesis, “philosophy” and “philosophers” are a shorthand for designating theorists or con-
ceptual thinkers of various sorts: those who either inquire into the underlying premises, 
assumptions, or “givens” of a discipline, or then again who consider and conceptualize the 
larger models and theories of said fields, or are engaged primarily in conceptual, rather than 
empirical analyses. A philosopher – a theoretician, irrespectful of the particular domain they 
are engaged in. 
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lity; every human potentiality is in relation to its own privation. This is the 
origin (and the abyss) of human power. The greatness of human potentiality is 
measured by the abyss of human impotentiality. (Agamben 1999: 182) 
 
This quote we can find roughly midway through the essay, where Agamben 
reaches a certain culmination, his substantial thesis. And the final quote is from 
Theodor Adorno’s The Jargon of Authenticity, a thoroughgoing critique of the 
Heideggerian concept of “authenticity”. More specifically, these are the very 
last lines of the book: 
 
This is the insight that dignity contains the form of its decadence within itself. 
The fact can be observed when intellectuals become accomplices of that power 
which they don't have and which they should resist. The Kantian dignity finally 
disintegrates into the jargon of authenticity. (Adorno 1973: 165) 
 
Now it is eminently clear that none of these citations have nothing whatsoever 
to do with animals, and in no way refer to anything nonhuman, animal or other-
wise. And the reason for this is that I have here committed a grievous academic 
sin of having doctored the quotes, and without even marking my omissions with 
the customary academic sign of the ellipsis. Let me now atone, and remedy my 
error, so that the entire reason for this brief exercise should come out, and make 
its somewhat straightforward point about philosophers who are not directly 
talking about animals, yet who nevertheless introduce animals into their texts. 
 First, Dewey in fact thinks the importance of memory for human affairs 
needs to be emphasized and highlighted by way of a repeated negation of it in 
animals (previously omitted excerpts are in bold): 
 
Man differs from the lower animals because he preserves his past experien-
ces. What happened in the past is lived again in memory. About what goes on 
today hangs a cloud of thoughts concerning similar things undergone in bygone 
days. With the animals, an experience perishes as it happens, and each new 
doing or suffering stands alone. But man lives in a world where each occur-
rence is charged with echoes and reminiscences of what has gone before, 
where each event is a reminder of other things. Hence he lives not, like the 
beasts of the field, in a world of merely physical things but in a world of 
signs and symbols. […] And all this which marks the difference between 
bestiality and humanity, between culture and merely physical nature, is 
because man remembers, preserving and recording his experiences. (Dewey 
1920: 1) 
 
Second, Agamben, whose entire paper is an analysis of one single concept from 
Aristotle, deems it important to bring in – and in this particular text to bring in 
just once, just this one time – a non-human figure: 
 
If we recall that Aristotle always draws his examples of this potentiality of 
non-Being from the domain of the arts and human knowledge, then we may say 
that human beings, insofar as they know and produce, are those beings who, 
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more than any other, exist in the mode of potentiality. Every human power is 
adynamia, impotentiality; every human potentiality is in relation to its own 
privation. This is the origin (and the abyss) of human power, which is so 
violent and limitless with respect to other living beings. Other living beings 
are capable only of their specific potentiality; they can only do this or that. 
But human beings are the animals who are capable of their own impo-
tentiality. The greatness of human potentiality is measured by the abyss of 
human impotentiality. (Agamben 1999: 182, emphasis in the original) 
 
And finally in our series of quasi-randomly chosen examples, we have a critique 
of the vagueness of the concept of authenticity as it was used in philosophical 
and political discourse in the early 20th century. In this entire book, the word 
“animal” appears all of five times, including twice in quotations from other 
texts, and once in an anecdote. Yet here are the actual final sentences of the 
book: 
 
This is the insight that dignity contains the form of its decadence within itself. 
The fact can be observed when intellectuals become accomplices of that power 
which they don't have and which they should resist. The Kantian dignity finally 
disintegrates into the jargon of authenticity. With it goes that humanity 
which has its basic nature not in self-reflection but in its difference from a 
suppressed animality. (Adorno 1973: 165) 
 
These then are three examples of what is meant with the question “How do 
philosophers talk about animals – while they are not specifically talking about 
animals?” All three authors are engaged in themes and topics entirely unrelated 
to nonhuman animals, yet all three felt it necessary to couch their claims with 
references to animals. Moreover, these examples – chosen from among a vast 
number of similar ones – are to be found in points in a text that are usually 
thought of having particular relevance: the very first sentences trying to capture 
the reader’s interest; the culmination of a text where the most substantial thesis 
is presented; the very end of the text which finalises the argument and draws it 
all together in a final crescendo. And as the above examples demonstrate, from 
all these places the references to animals can simply be deleted, since they play 
no substantial role whatsoever in the argument at hand, they are in no wise 
explanatory, and do not lend support the specific, concrete thing that is being 
argued for. But they do something. Indeed, it seems that the primary function of 
including animals in this particular manner – including them with the sole pur-
pose of immediately excluding them – is to legitimise and lend weight to the 
given argument by way of an appeal to human uniqueness and dignity, and this 
in complete disregard of the fact that these animal references do not substantiate 
the specific issue the philosopher is discussing in any way. What we have here 
is indeed a variant what Giorgio Agamben himself (ironically, for he seems to 
have failed to apply his own concepts to his discussion of potentiality) in a 
different context called inclusive exclusion (1998: 8), of including something so 
that its immediate exclusion could legitimise and lend weight to order and 
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normalcy. The force of an argument is heightened and its credibility reinforced 
by showing what it excludes and pushes to the outside. 
This then is the basic starting point and general theme of this thesis. When 
we analyse such examples of philosophers who bring in animals in contexts 
where animals are entirely superfluous for the issue at hand, we may be able to 
detect a certain pattern to it, a certain set of characteristics or dimensions that 
are repeated over and over in similar contexts, and which will reveal to us an 
undercurrent of animal narratives, recurrent themes in philosophical discourse, a 
subconsciousness concerning nonhuman animals. The general claim of this 
thesis is that this recurrent discourse on animals in philosophy and elsewhere 
can be encapsulated in the following six theses: 
 
1. The uniqueness of human nature can be determined by studying humans 
alone 
2. The most important characteristic of animals is that they lack something 
human 
3. When humans are compared to animals, humans are described as uni-
que; when animals are compared between one another, they are 
described as merely differing from one another 
4. The distinction between humans and animals is something mental, or 
reducible to the mental 
5. Animals are discussed in general singular, as one indistinct, undifferen-
tiated category 
6. Humans reach their true nature only when they expel or remove the 
animal from within themselves 
 
These six points form the core of the first three papers of this thesis, for which 
reason they are not much extended or explicated at this juncture. Just the 
briefest summary is in order. Something like the following, then, is the com-
posite narrative of the philosophic discourse on animals. First, the exceptional 
nature of humans is determined by mirror-gazing: what is uniquely human is 
decided beforehand and without any consideration of, comparison with, or 
study of nonhuman animals. And since the primary function of this uniqueness 
is to lend credence to the actual discourse at hand through its negation in non-
humans, the list of such uniquely human traits is positively endless, since they 
are, in each particular case, generated by that act of negation. Thus for each idea 
or concept that a philosopher thinks is important, it will be artificially accom-
panied by a corresponding lack of that same idea or concept in animals. Lan-
guage, speech, symbolic forms, rationality, reason, intentionality, freedom, cul-
ture, history, consciousness, subjectivity, personhood, individuality, the immor-
tal soul, self-reflection, laughter, ethics, politics, law, rights, property, expe-
rience of death, tool-making, labour, wearing clothes, feeling naked, making a 
fire, lying, pretending, bartering, shame, guilt, the as-such or the Lichtung of the 
metaphysicians… 
14 
 This lack pertains to all animals in their totality. They can be, it is true, com-
pared to one another, but that would amount to nothing but an indication of their 
species-specific differences from one another; it would not be an indication of 
their uniqueness or exceptional status as nonhumans. Compared to humans, ani-
mals form a homogenous category and are all indistinct, an undifferentiated 
collective whose function is to reinforce human uniqueness by their lack. This is 
not to deny that in empirical research some of these criteria for distinguishing 
humans from animals may turn out to be accurate – that some particular traits 
may indeed be uniquely human. Two things must be kept in mind, however. 
First, this can only be determined comparatively, with respect to particular other 
species, for to do otherwise and attribute a lack of supposed uniquely human 
traits to animals tout court would be to commit what Gilbert Ryle (2002: 16) 
famously called a category mistake: the generic abstract category “animals” 
cannot have properties that characterise (or not, as the case may be) concrete 
existing species and individuals. To do otherwise would amount to thinking, as 
Karl Marx once wrote in a rather different context, “as if alongside and external 
to lions, tigers, rabbits, and all other actual animals […] there existed also in 
addition the animal, the individual incarnation of the entire animal kingdom” 
(1976: 27). Second and more importantly, the issue is rather that the items in the 
list above – which can be extended indefinitely – are usually not at all derived 
from empirical research but by negation, by denying in nonhumans that which 
was first decided to be uniquely human (as per point 1, above). Furthermore, the 
traits or criteria for determining human uniqueness are mental or reducible to 
the mental: something akin to smallpox (which is uniquely human since it has 
no other disease vectors than another human) would not do as the indicator of 
human uniqueness. 
Finally, the sixth point refers to what Giorgio Agamben in his The Open 
(2004) has called the “anthropological machine”, according to which human 
beings are conceived of as constitutionally dual, part animal, part human, in 
which the ascent to true humanity is achieved by the suppression of the animal 
within. Commonly, it is that very mark of the mental, or its culture-based surro-
gates, which mark human transcendence above or beyond nature (cf. Rattasepp 
2014, the third paper in this thesis). Thus the  
 
effort to define the human being has usually required a preliminary gesture of 
exclusion: a rhetorical animal sacrifice. The presence of the animal must first 
be extinguished for the human being to appear. (Lippit 2000: 8) 
 
Granted, not all of these six principles (or perhaps presumptions or assump-
tions) in our list appear wholly and clearly in any particular text – sometimes 
only some of these points are concretely present in a given text. Moreover, there 
are other ways in which animals can appear in texts in which they are made to 
play a role as something other than actual representatives of nonhuman animals. 
Sometimes they are utilized as nonspecific placeholders in the sense that the 
concrete, chosen animal is interchangeable, such that any one species is as good 
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as another to be used as an example (John Buridan was in fact not at all 
interested in donkeys). Or they can be used as codes or metaphors awaiting 
interpretation, in that behind the animal lurks a general philosophical idea which 
must be found or revealed (e.g. one of the primary functions of medieval 
bestiaries was to depict moral virtues and vices) (Tyler 2012: 4). In addition, 
particularly in animal ethics and critical animal studies, but also elsewhere, the 
premise of human-animal continuity, usually based on Darwinian ontology, is 
entirely prevalent as the basis on which attempts are made to establish moral 
identity between humans and other animals (cf. Calarco 2011: 42–48). Never-
theless, outside of specifically ethical consideration of nonhuman animals, these 
six points or presumptions comprise the unvoiced visage of nonhumans in 
philosophy, its “common sense” about animals. In fact, they comprise precisely 
that “asinanity” for which Derrida so trenchantly criticizes philosophers when 
they “speak blithely of the Animal in the general singular” and attribute to 
themselves the “right, the theoretical or philosophical right, to distinguish and 
mark as opposite, namely, the set of the Animal in general, the Animal spoken 
of in the general singular” (2008: 40–41). 
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ANIMAL EPISODES IN HUMAN PHILOSOPHY 
He fell in love with himself at first sight, 
and it is a passion to which he has always 
remained faithful.  
–Anthony Powell (1962: 33) 
 
That nonhuman animals are described as lacking, and as wholly negatively 
distinct from humans should be so obvious and commonplace that de-
monstrating this on the basis of specific sources feels almost superfluous. 
Nevertheless, we should provide some concrete examples and elaborate on 
them. But where to begin? Declarations of human uniqueness, and the cor-
responding lack of that very thing in animals, are innumerable. I remember at 
some point listening to a radio interview with a theatre producer who was asked 
about the expected audience for his next production, and the producer answered 
that it is meant for everyone, because, after all, animals don’t go to theatre. Such 
declarations are so easy to find that an attempt to put together even an illustra-
tive selection would be exhausting, to the point that I am tempted to appeal to 
authority and rely rather on Jacques Derrida who, in making much the same 
claim, goes so far as to declare that it is one that is “by far the one that occurs 
most abundantly. It is probably what brings together all philosophers and all 
theoreticians as such” (2008: 13). Or perhaps one can follow the lead of Akira 
Lippit, who in his Electric Animal traverses Western philosophy step by step, in 
order to demonstrate how nonhuman animals always retain their place in 
philosophy, albeit as a ghostly presence and a spectral reminder – “a genus of 
vanishing animals, whose very being is constituted by that state of dis-
appearing” (Lippit 2000: 3) –, no matter how much the various thinkers have 
attempted to expel them as unworthy of equal interest and treatment. But pro-
ceed we must, albeit selectively. (For further readings on animals in continental 
thought, see Calarco, Atterton 2004). Let us take first some general examples, 
before proceeding to more philosophically proper authors and arguments. Hu-
mans as transcending nature is a theme probably as old as thought itself. For 
present purposes, however, we will mostly omit extended historical digressions. 
The 20th century alone has seen a plenitude examples of this kind in widely 
disparate fields.  
The ascent of “man” from the organic to something like a new “superorga-
nic” realm, as it was dubbed by Alfred Kroeber (1917), together with the idea of 
leaving the animals behind, stuck haplessly in the deterministic world of bio-
logy, has a long and illustrious history in Western thought. This history has 
been told often (see e.g. Collingwood 1960). From the story of Creation in the 
Bible, with its exhortations to “fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion” 
over it (Gen. 1:28), to Francis Bacon’s demand that “mankind regain their rights 
over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God” (Novum Organon, §CXXIX) 
and all the way to the present techno-scientific domination and management of 
the Earth, this story need not be retold in full here. With a brief lull during the 
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late 19th century, as a result of the spread of Darwin’s theory of evolution and 
the unfortunate concomitant spread of racist Social Darwinism (lull in the sense 
that “man’s” superior position could be explained evolutionarily, not transcen-
dentally), it was soon picked up again during the 20th century. Granted, in 
Kroeber’s and many others’ case it was as a direct response and reaction to So-
cial Darwinism that they once again postulated a different, radical condition for 
humans as opposed to nature. Yet the solution to the denigrations of Social Dar-
winism was to return to the old, albeit by reworking the mental into the cultural: 
 
The mind and the body are but facets of the same organic material or activity; 
the social substance – or unsubstantial fabric, if one prefers the phrase, – the 
existence that we call civilization, transcends them utterly for all its being 
forever rooted in life. (Kroeber 1917: 212) 
 
There is, furthermore, usually nothing thinly veiled or allusionary about declara-
tions of human superiority to and transcendence over nature. It is, in fact, what 
Cary Wolfe has called the “fundamental anthropological dogma” (2010: xiv). 
Take, for example, the case of Luc Ferry, who, granted, is somewhat of an 
exceptional case, since for Ferry environmentalism is akin to Fascism and Sta-
linist Communism. His understanding of “man’s” place in nature, however, is 
exceedingly commonplace, as when he declares without any false modesty that 
 
man is the antinatural being par excellence. This is even what distinguishes 
him from other beings, including those who seem the closest to him: the 
animals. […] humankind is not bound to instinct, to biological processes alone, 
that it possesses a history, that generations follow one another but do not 
necessarily resemble each other – while the animal kingdom observes perfect 
continuity. (1995: xxviii) 
 
There have been similar engagements with such a practice of division in the 
domain of semiotics as well. The interminable debates about semiotic thres-
holds, whether lower or symbolic, need not be rehashed here. Let us only make 
a brief historical note. Ever since at least Plato’s Cratylus and throughout the 
middle ages, signs were customarily divided into natural and conventional ones. 
There are, however, two ways of thinking the relation between the two. The 
more commonplace and intuitive – for both the disputants in Cratylus to the 
naïve realists of the present day – was to ground natural signs in nature or the 
world of things so that they are directly given to experience, and to treat 
conventional signs as having value only as a result of their fidelity to the natural 
ones. Truth and its approximation, or the certain and the probable: this was the 
principled division between the natural and the artificial in the domain of signs. 
Yet as Michel Foucault has argued, this relation is reversed from the 17th 
century onward. First of all, the natural sign is no longer the givenness that is 
the foundation for truth; instead, the natural sign too is constituted by an act of 
knowing, rather than merely requiring its recognition. It is nevertheless a sign 
that, as such, is “strictly limited, rigid, inconvenient, and impossible for the 
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mind to master” (Foucault 2002: 68). A conventional sign, on the other hand, is 
artfully constituted such that it would be “simple, easy to remember, applicable 
to an indefinite number of elements, susceptible of subdivision within itself and 
of combination with other signs; the man-made sign is the sign at the peak of its 
activity” (ibid.). A freely constituted, flexible sign that needs no reference to 
anything other than other signs, and needs no grounding from anything natural, 
only that of the collective of similar sign-users. This was the birth of the symbol 
as we know it in semiotics today. And it has also, from the very beginning, been 
thought of as threshold which the animals cannot pass: “It is the man-made sign 
that draws the dividing-line between man and animal; that transforms imagi-
nation into voluntary memory, spontaneous attention into reflection, and instinct 
into rational knowledge” (ibid.). Ever since then, the domain of artificial signs, 
of symbols, is commonly thought of as almost constituting a separate realm of 
being, superimposed upon yet wholly distinct from that of nature. This was, for 
example, the belief of Ernst Cassirer, who wrote in his Essay on Man that “As 
compared with the other animals man lives not only in a broader reality; he 
lives, so to speak, in a new dimension of reality. […] No longer in a merely 
physical universe, man lives in a symbolic universe” (1953: 43).  
Reference to human uniqueness by way of symbol-use and the correspon-
ding semiotic or symbolic threshold continues to hold sway in semiotic litera-
ture (for an overview of the status of semiotic thresholds in current debates, see 
Higuera, Kull 2017). Since the more prevalent Peircean conception of symbols 
is not easily amenable to constituting such a radical discontinuity (this would 
entail reconceptualising habit as uniquely human – a difficult proposition in-
deed), Carlo Brentari refers the genesis of this conception back to the German 
philosophical anthropology of the mid-20th century (Brentari 2018). In their 
otherwise admirable attempt to rid philosophy of idealism and metaphysics, 
these anthropological philosophers nevertheless reintroduced a radical human-
animal discontinuity through their concept of Sonderstellung or “special posi-
tion,” which hangs on the “semiotic organisation of human and animal cog-
nition, a difference that is centred on the respective usage of signs and symbols” 
(ibid.). Animal signs or signals are proxies of objects and function as stimuli, 
and thus reside in the external environment, whereas symbols, used only by 
humans, are related to mental activity, of conceptual thought:  
 
In talking about things we have conceptions of them, not the things themselves; 
and it is the conceptions, not the things, that symbols directly ‘mean.’ Behavior 
toward conceptions is what words normally evoke; this is the typical process of 
thinking. (Langer 1954: 49) 
 
Thus according to philosophical anthropology, the interjection of symbols into 
the middle of a reflex arc turns reacting into thinking. As such, the move taken 
by philosophical anthropology corresponds precisely to point 4, above: the 
human-animal distinction must be made by reference to the mental. 
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Symbol use as the distinguishing trait that sets humans apart is also prevalent 
in texts which ostensibly are, unlike authors such as Cassirer, directly and 
literally about animals and about how to make them more interesting for people. 
Thus the conservationist Jeffrey Bonner, in a fascinating book about his long 
experience with animals in zoos, nevertheless declares that 
 
The capacity for symbolic learning sets humans apart. Yes, many animals can 
communicate using symbols. But all of those forms of symbolic communi-
cation are strictly limited. In the case of humans, we can communicate so much 
more that a quantitative difference becomes a qualitative one. (2006: 54) 
 
We probably should not fault a natural scientist for not noticing the philo-
sophical peculiarity of getting from quantity to quality as if it were a steady 
change or increase until, at some strange point along a number line, it suddenly 
transforms itself into something entirely different. It goes hand in hand, 
however, with the idea of human transcendence over nature, and of semiotic 
thresholds, where a steady change or accumulation is imagined to transform, at 
some moment in time, the entire system itself. Much has been made of the 
arguments whether the distinction between humans and animals is a difference 
in “degree” or in “kind”, but what we have here is a curious case in which some 
sufficient amount of change in “degree” ends up turning into a difference in 
“kind”. As such, it is an argument for emergence, a concept and a phenomenon 
much debated in disparate fields in the sciences, including biosemiotics. Emer-
gent properties themselves are commonplace and uncontroversial, even if the 
emergence of life, sentience, and consciousness currently remain little under-
stood. A convincing case for biosemiotics has been made by Terrence Deacon 
in his Incomplete Nature (…), demonstrating the steady appearance of various 
emergent higher-order properties from the various dynamics residing at the 
lower levels. Now is not the time to go into technical details, particularly con-
sidering the fact that Deacon’s analyses of levels of emergence do not track 
neatly with species divides, let alone anything as crude as a simple human-
animal divide. Moreover, emergence must be shown and explained, as in Dea-
con, rather than postulated, as in Bonner, above. Thus for the present more 
general philosophic discussion we should note with Pierre Bourdieu that “[t]he 
shift from the highest probability to absolute certainty is a qualitative leap out of 
proportion to the numerical difference” (1990: 99) – and this also applies to the 
qualitative-quantitative distinction. The difference between the qualitative and 
the quantitative is itself a qualitative one.  
More importantly, we should also note here that the idea of an evolutionary 
continuity with nonhuman animals is not in itself necessarily free of anthropo-
centrism, either, at least as a critique of the discontinuity thesis. For it often 
comes with an unvoiced premise. It is that if humans are “just another” animal, 
they can then presumably be reduced to a lower level where the rest of the 
animals are supposed to reside (and in this case, animals are once again not 
different, but lower). This position retains the idea of a special status for all 
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animals, and the only move is then to “correct” the misplacement of humans 
into a unique state. But the presumption of all animals constituting a homo-
genous mass is nevertheless retained. This corresponds to point 5, above: that 
“the animal” is an undifferentiated, general category. The problem here is that 
there is no such “animal” state. Instead, the presumed “lack” of human propriety 
in nonhumans indicates another mode of nonhuman existence. The continuity 
thesis ends up removing, quite similarly to the discontinuity thesis, all speci-
ficity from nonhuman animals, whereas in fact there are as many singularities 
and umwelts as there are individual species (and perhaps individuals). Conti-
nuism is anthropocentric in that it leads to the conception that nonhuman 
animals have an impoverished version of what is found in a fuller degree in 
humans (point 1 and 2, above). Thus 
 
animals emerge from continuism enhanced by a sort of pseudo-humanity or 
humanity in the making, but this making has no future. Animals would be 
replicas fashioned more or less after a human model that remains the culm-
ination of all cognitive aptitudes, affective dispositions, and performances of 
any kind. And how could it be otherwise when animals are measured against 
humans? (Burgat 2017: 54). 
 
Yet another way of drawing the human-animal divide is to present humans as 
having rid themselves of all essentialist characteristics. In these cases, to con-
sider humans unique is to postulate humans as having no nature, as opposed to 
animals who are entirely constituted and thus constrained by their evolved bio-
logical makeup and a set of deterministic instincts, and who are therefore 
indistinctly and inseparably immured in the very fabric of the world: “every 
animal is in the world like water in water” (Bataille, cited in Calarco, Atterton 
2004: 34, emphasis in the original). This was particularly prevalent among the 
existentialists, with the linchpin being Sartre’s much-read and much-quoted 
Existentialism is a Humanism of 1946. In it, Sartre declares – accompanied by 
the unsurprising denunciation that “man’s” existence is “rather unlike that of a 
patch of moss, a spreading fungus, or a cauliflower” (2007: 23) – that “man” 
 
materializes in the world, encounters himself, and only afterward defines him-
self. If man as existentialists conceive of him cannot be defined, it is because to 
begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be 
what he makes of himself. (Sartre 1946: 22) 
 
By far the most commented of such existentialist declarations of the ineffable 
uniqueness of the human condition with its foundational lack of essence and 
thus its boundless capacity of constituting itself and the world around it, and 
which Sartre follows almost to a letter, is to be found in that (in)famous decla-
ration by Martin Heidegger that the animals are “poor in world” and inanimate 
things are “worldless,” as opposed to the “world-forming” powers of man 
(1995: 185ff). For present purposes we can take Heidegger as a paradigmatic 
example of the philosophic discourse on animals, for in his writings, parti-
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cularly in his The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics of 1929/30, he lays 
down this type of discourse beat by beat.  
Now it is true that, at least to begin with, Heidegger casts doubt at any 
simple hierarchical orientations or value judgments between humans and 
animals, despite the apparent clarity indicated by the choice of words “poor” 
and “forming” (Heidegger 1995: 194). For neither animals nor humans can be 
placed in a simple line of ascent or measurement, where for example one crea-
ture’s world is richer than that of another’s, or that one has more senses or 
behaviours or more or less degree of freedom. But this is essentially a dodge on 
Heidegger’s part, for he is not, in the end, interested in the sort of knowledge 
that may be derived from natural sciences to help us decide about the richness 
of sensation or behaviour or lack of them in nonhuman animals. Instead, he is 
interested in a fundamental metaphysical distinction which would allow him to 
draw the line between the animality as such of animals from the humanity as 
such of “man” in a manner in which animals in their very essence would be 
wholly deprived of world (ibid, 196). In fact, Heidegger’s prohibitions against 
creating hierarchies and value judgements between animals and humans takes 
on a rather deceptive tone in light of his initial statement about the naiveté in-
volved in treating material objects, animals, and humans “as if the three beings 
we have mentioned were three things of the same order, as if they were all on 
the same plane” (ibid, 185). For the conclusion that Heidegger will want to 
reach is that there is in fact an “abyssal” difference between “man” and 
“animal” as such, which, in Matthew Calarco’s summary, is to be “understood 
in the most fundamental and radical way possible”, for that abyss “marks a gap 
and a rupture which is utterly untraversable” (Calarco 2008: 22). For Heidegger, 
it is precisely this “as-structure” of which animals are deprived of and is the 
reason why they are poor in world: animals, too, may experience things, but 
never experience them as-them; they cannot be open to the Being of their being. 
Thus for example animals and humans both die, but the death (or “demise”) of 
Dasein takes place within a specific modality of being towards death and fini-
tude, whereas animals, lacking this, merely perish unawares. Heidegger stacks 
up this list: Dasein exists, the animal merely lives; Dasein eats, the animal 
merely feeds, the animal behaves, Dasein has a “comportment”, etc. (ibid, 26).  
Moreover, it is a stance which does not proceed from any interest in the 
possibly unique modes of being possessed by other animals; rather, it is 
grounded on fear of or anxiousness about the loss of human dignity and is an 
attempt to prevent this loss of dignity which would supposedly result if the 
“dignity” afforded to animals were to increase. This prevalent conceit among 
thinkers of human uniqueness conceives of human-animal relations (particularly 
ethical ones) as akin to a zero-sum game, a calculus of morals in which ethical 
dignity decreases on the human side the more it is attributed to animals, as if to 
give more consideration to one means to give less consideration to the other. 
Thus in another context Heidegger radicalizes the human/animal divide to the 
point of declaring them to be entirely incommensurable and fundamentally 
incomparable even as opposites, for “oppositions, even the most extreme, still 
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require one same domain in which to be posed against each other” (Heidegger 
1992: 152). Anxiously acknowledging the “scarcely conceivable, abysmal bodi-
ly kinship with the beast” (Heidegger 1998: 248), Heidegger accuses biology 
and psychoanalysis of complete obliviousness and ignorance of all laws of 
Being, of the uniquely human openness to the “free of Being”, which results in 
“an uncanny hominization of the “creature,” i.e., the animal, and a corres-
ponding animalization of man” (Heidegger 1992: 152), an abandonment of 
human being to the realm of animalitas.  
The result is anthropocentrism of the most commonplace kind, corres-
ponding to the six dimensions described above almost point by point: the exa-
mination proceeds from the presumption of the uniqueness of Dasein; to study 
animals is to understand what they lack; the difference is not to be found in 
anything biological but rather in a metaphysical mode of being; the mode of 
being proper to Dasein is lacking in all animals tout court; and the purpose of 
the entire exercise is to reveal the essential, foundational uniqueness and 
exceptionality of the human. 
 
* * * 
 
The final contention from all of these examples and debates should be clear: we 
should stop asking the question “what is proper to Man”, particularly any and 
all forms of the question that take as their point of departure the denigration of 
nonhuman animals. Instead of seeking new, more effective or more authentic 
articulations of what it means to be human (to the exclusion of all nonhumans), 
we should rather show, to quote Giorgio Agamben, “the central emptiness, the 
hiatus that – within man – separates man and animal, and to risk ourselves in 
this emptiness: the suspension of the suspension, Shabbat of both animal and 
man” (2004: 92). Yet – and this must be emphasized – since what is at stake is 
both the human and the nonhuman, we must not fall into that very opposite trap 
of deeming impropriety the new “proper” of human existence, in the manner of 
Sartre and Heidegger. As Viveiros de Castro has put it, 
 
The point of contesting the question, “what is (proper to) Man?” then, is abso-
lutely not to say that “Man” has no essence, that his existence precedes his 
essence, that the being of Man is freedom and indetermination, but to say that 
the question has become, for all-too obvious historical reasons, one that it is 
impossible to respond to without dissimulation, without, in other words, conti-
nuing to repeat that the chief property of Man is to have no final properties, 
which apparently earns Man unlimited rights to the properties of the other. 
(2014: 44) 
 
A principled philosophical stance here would be one of indistinction with res-
pect to the “question of the animal”, of “what is proper to man”, where any line-
drawing between humans and animals, as Matthew Calarco has put it, “no 
longer serves as a guardrail for thought and practice” but would rather mark “an 
23 
effort to render inoperative any nostalgia for extending human traits to animals 
or for complicating the differences between human beings and animals” (2011: 
54). We have to begin by imagining the existence of living creatures whose 
diversity cannot be amassed together within the single figure of “animality” that 
is simply opposed to humanity. Such an attitude would be expectant, and would 
let go of any desire to determine hierarchically the place and status of all the 
beings, things and events in the world, and instead allow them to arrive and 
surprise and “interrupt one’s mode of existence and have a transformative 
effect, as an arrivant, an absolute newcomer” (ibid, 52). For, as Roberto 
Marchesini has put it, “the human being does not emerge from a disjunction or 
purification from otherness – that is, from a self-referential humanity (as in 
Descartes’ cogito) – but, on the contrary, from a hospitable openness toward 
otherness” (2017: 140). In fact, perhaps we should entirely let go of talk about 
“characteristics” or “traits” or “properties” as such, and pay attention to the 
constitutive relations, connections and semiotic links that embed and intertwine 
us into our environments and associate us with a myriad of both non-human 
species and non-living aspects of the world (including technology, and eco-
systems, and the built and unbuilt world), since they all constitute humans and 
nonhumans together. The posthumanist is not interested in State animals, as 
Deleuze and Guattari called them (2008: 265), describable through characte-
ristics and attributes; instead, the posthumanist runs with the demonic animals, 
“pack or affect animals that form a multiplicity, a becoming, a population, a 
tale” (ibid.). For what if, as Lyotard once asked, “what is ‘proper’ to humankind 
were to be inhabited by the inhuman?” (Lyotard 1991: 2). Becoming-animal is a 
matter neither of delineating human-animal distinctions nor identifying with 
animals, but rather that of symbiosis, affect, alliance, and contagion. Or as 
Deleuze and Guattari once put it:  
 
We are not interested in characteristics; what interests us are modes of expan-
sion, propagation, occupation, contagion, peopling. […] What would a lone 
wolf be? Or a whale, a louse, a rat, a fly? Beelzebub is the Devil, but the Devil 
as lord of the flies. The wolf is not fundamentally a characteristic or a certain 
number of characteristics; it is a wolfing. The louse is a lousing, and so on. 
What is a cry independent of the population it appeals to or takes as its 
witness? (Deleuze, Guattari 2008: 264) 
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CONCEPTS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
Correlationism 
For instance, what about this tree, that 
others call Wellingtonia? […] If it is 
lacking anything, then it is most unlikely 
to be you. 
–Bruno Latour (1988: 193) 
 
In April 2007 a small seminar took place at Goldsmiths, University of London. 
Titled ‘Speculative Realism: A One-Day Workshop’, it featured but four 
speakers: Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman, and Quentin 
Meillassoux. Its purpose was to question the consensus of continental philo-
sophy of having overcome old metaphysical debates about realism and idealism, 
subject and object by declaring that the solution is to put primacy on the 
constitutive relation between the two. Instead, the seminar wanted to ask, “Is 
realism really so ‘naive’? And is the widespread dismissal of representation and 
objectivity the radical, critical stance it so often claims to be?” (the full trans-
cript of the event can be found in Mackay 2012: 307–449). 
 It was an event which, over the next few years, was to launch an academic 
storm, a supposed new paradigm shift and the first new thing in philosophy 
since post-structuralism. A separate journal, Speculations, was launched, and 
another one, Collapse veered heavily in its direction. An eponymous mono-
graph series was launched. Naturally enough, in this era of endless academic 
turns, it too was declared a “turn” (Bryant, et al. 2011). Reams of papers and 
books were published.2 And as so often happens in cases where declarations of 
importance are reversely proportional to the substance of the work, speculative 
realism soon collapsed in on itself. None of the original participants of the 
Goldmiths seminar no longer use the term “speculative realism”, and have 
mostly distanced themselves from it. Whether such a thing exists or should exist 
has been questioned (Brassier 2014: 407–421) and the purported turn was soon 
declared to be both over (Kolozova, Joy 2016) and of having been about 
nothing other than the old Kantian noumenon all along (Wolfendale 2014; for a 
Whiteheadian critique, see Shaviro 2014). Other than attempts at turning it into 
a brand by Graham Harman,3 its most vociferous defender and supporter, it is, 
while no doubt having left an indelible mark on the philosophical landscape, 
now mostly a movement that never was. And in a statement during an interview 
for the online journal Kronos, one of the supposed founding members of the 
speculative realism movement, Ray Brassier, had this now infamous thing to 
say about it: 
                                                            
2  Too numerous to list. Even just for full-length monographs see Harman 2013, 2018a, 
2018b; Bryant 2011; Morton 2013a, 2013b; Garcia 2014; Willems 2017. This list, while 
representative, is also incomplete. 
3  This is not a denigration, but rather Harman’s own stated goal: see Bryant et al. 2011: 21. 
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The “speculative realist movement” exists only in the imaginations of a group 
of bloggers promoting an agenda for which I have no sympathy whatsoever. 
[…] I agree with Deleuze's remark that ultimately the most basic task of 
philosophy is to impede stupidity, so I see little philosophical merit in a “move-
ment” whose most signal achievement thus far is to have generated an online 
orgy of stupidity.4 
 
For all these academic dramas, the critical core concept that launched this entire 
purported turn has remained relatively robust, and has now entered the philo-
sophical lexicon, most likely to stay. Found in a slim volume called After 
Finitude (2008) by Quentin Meillassoux, it was the concept of correlation / 
correlationism. It was quickly picked up by realists of all stripes as indicating a 
symptom of modern philosophy. It eloquently put its finger on the root cause of 
the unease these thinkers felt about philosophy which had been turned almost 
entirely into epistemology, into discourse on human meaning-making. They 
wanted a way out, and this seemed like the avenue they had been looking for all 
along. But it was their new models, their new metaphysics, which unfortunately 
ended up going nowhere, for they never amounted to anything more than a 
number of idiosyncratic speculations, and it was this lack of coherence that was 
the movement’s downfall and the reason it never turned into a properly philo-
sophical school or movement. 
 As a now-foundational concept for critiquing anti-realist positions, correla-
tionism is relevant for animal studies and zoosemiotics, and merits addressing. 
Correlationism, then, is what Meillassoux calls an “explicit decision” by conti-
nental philosophers, from transcendental philosophy to phenomenology and 
postmodernism, that “there are no objects, no events, no laws, no beings which 
are not always already correlated with a point of view, with a subjective access” 
(2014: 9). In short, correlationism amounts to the conviction that it is an absur-
dity to think of anything (from things in themselves to nonhuman subjectivities) 
as existing outside and independently of our constitutive relation to it. This is 
because to think or talk about something is to first posit it, to experience or 
cognize it, for that something cannot exist without it being first manifest or 
given. Any argument against such “philosophies of access” – for at bottom all 
these philosophies circle around the question of how the mind gets to know, to 
access the external world – is effectively a performative contradiction in which 
the counter-argument contradicts itself by the very act of being presented:  
 
every objection against correlationism is an objection produced by your 
thinking, and so dependent upon it. When you speak against correlation, you 
forget that you speak against correlation, hence from the viewpoint of your 
own mind, or culture, or epoch, etc. (ibid, 10) 
 
                                                            
4  The interview is no longer available at its original location, but numerous extracts and 
quotations from it can be freely found online. 
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This, then, is the core of correlationism: any given thing or phenomenon is a 
correlate of thinking. Therefore, any argument about things in themselves, of 
the an sich, cannot but be naïve, or even impossible, for 
 
thought cannot get outside itself in order to compare the world as it is ‘in itself’ 
to the world as it is ‘for us’, and thereby distinguish what is a function of our 
relation to the world from what belongs to the world alone. Such an enterprise 
is effectively self-contradictory, for at the very moment when we think of a 
property as belonging to the world in itself, it is precisely the latter that we are 
thinking, and consequently this property is revealed to be essentially tied to our 
thinking about the world. (Meillassoux 2008: 3–4) 
 
Moreover, correlationism is asymmetrical, in the sense that it is the side of 
thinking or the mind that does the heavy lifting, because the conditions of possi-
bility for any access to reality are to be found on the human side, be it in the 
transcendental categories of the mind of the idealists, or consciousness or Da-
sein or language, or any hypostatization of these into “culture” or Weltan-
schauung. These, no matter what particular concept or framework is used in a 
given context, are the conditions that make any manifestation (that is, repre-
sentation, cognition, phenomenon, etc.) possible, thereby subsuming the mani-
festation itself and making it secondary to these conditions of possibility (Bras-
sier 2007: 51). For it is part and parcel of Western metaphysics to privilege the 
immaterial as logically prior to the material, and to claim that while the im-
material requires a material basis at least in some sense, it is nevertheless irredu-
cible to it. It may well be, it is argued, that human beings are an evolved, bio-
logical species, just another one among the animals, yet this mode of existence 
as biological beings merely provides the material basis for the transcendental 
regime and its means of objectivation. This is the old metaphysical distinction 
between the transcendental and the empirical, in which the former is merely 
instantiated in the latter and which provides the transcendental with its material 
conditions and empirical support, but is in itself nevertheless wholly distinct 
from it (ibid, 56–57). This is why the prioritization of the correlation between 
the two – between thinking and being – does not lead to a mutual, symmetrical 
constitution of the two sides, but instead to the subsumption of things to that 
which form and regulate them, that is, the subsumption of the empirical under 
the transcendental (ibid, 64). In short, for this asymmetrical correlationism, the 
thinking side is conceived of as the more dominant one. It is in fact that old 
Cartesian premise, endlessly rejected and criticised yet always returning, always 
sneakily present again, that the “I” accompanies any thought and therefore self-
referentiality is the primary and fundamental condition of all thinking, of all 
representations. It was precisely on such or similar lines of reasoning that the 
“modern constitution” (Latour 1993: 13ff) was founded: to know is to filter a 
singular but ultimately unknowable nature through the ever-multiplying frames 
of culture. For, as “everybody knows”, since it would be naïve to believe in any 
immediate access to external reality, the only conception left is that there is “the 
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human history of nature on the one hand, and on the other, the natural non-
history of nature” (Latour 2004: 33): multiculturalism is always accompanied 
by mononaturalism. 
 Such is the general defence of human uniqueness in matters epistemological: 
the world, as Kant famously declared in his Copernican turn, is made to circle 
around the knower, whose powers are such as to constitute that very world from 
itself. But at least when it comes to philosophy proper, it is at least assumed that 
the unknowable an sich still exists out there, in whatever inaccessible form, and 
that anything cognized is at least a synthesis of some sort between the knower 
and the known. At the birth of the human sciences, however, this basic as-
sumption took an unexpected turn for the extreme. For the figure which, 
according to Michel Foucault, ushered in modernity and laid the foundation for 
the human sciences, is a historically specific understanding of the nature of 
“man”, of “human nature”, a figure which he named the “empirico-transcen-
dental doublet”. This doublet is “a being such that knowledge will be attained in 
him of what renders all knowledge possible” (2002: 347), a “paradoxical figure 
in which the empirical contents of knowledge necessarily release, of them-
selves, the conditions that have made them possible” (ibid., 351). This con-
ception renders moot any consideration of the things of the world, of any 
synthesis with the an sich, or considerations of human umwelt. By definition 
this figure, which is central to the genesis and genealogy of the humanities, of 
the human sciences, is inward-turning and exclusionary, for it finds both its em-
pirical object of study, as well as the conditions of possibility for that very study 
from the same place – from “man”, from “the human condition”. The what and 
the how of any inquiry are, from the perspective of the doublet, the very same 
thing. And it is all this that led Meillassoux to complain, in that famous, now 
oft-quoted passage, of contemporary philosophers’ loss of the great outdoors 
“which thought could explore with the legitimate feeling of being on foreign 
territory – of being entirely elsewhere” (Meillassoux 2008: 7). 
 Perhaps this explains, to some length at least, why it has taken such a long 
time for something like the animal turn (and even later, the turn to things, to 
objects, to any kind of nonhuman) to appear as a discipline or a program of 
research within the humanities. For the logic of the doublet necessarily also 
impacts that which may at first seem to fall outside its purview. Within the 
scope of the doublet animals, or more importantly the animality of the human, 
are left over as a spectral reminder: cast out as irrelevant because of their lack of 
human propriety, yet brought back as a reminiscence of the animal within. 
Animals are included in general discourse only in order to signify their own 
expulsion, as if placed on the outside of the inside, or vice versa. They find 
themselves within the anthropological machinery of inclusive exclusion, as the 
always-present rejects of what Giorgio Agamben described as foundational to 
Western politics and metaphysics: “man is the living being who, in language, 
separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, main-
tains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion” (Agamben 
1998: 8). And this inclusive exclusion is far from being innocent and merely 
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constitutive of the human condition, for as Massimo Filippi argues, it consti-
tutes a “double move” of 
 
an appropriating exclusion  –  which degrades animals to things, goods, labor  –  
and an ex-propriating inclusion  –  which equates ourselves to angels in order 
to deny our fragile and mortal corporeality. This double move allows us to 
place ourselves outside of nature and to have the whole of existence at our 
disposal as if we were its absolute owners. (Filippi 2011: 1) 
 
As long as the logic of the doublet is operable within the human sciences, 
knowledge of animals is neither objective nor subjective, but abjective. They 
are neither the beings who have been put in front (as the etymology of objectāre 
indicates) of human discourse, ready to be brought in as partners in knowledge, 
nor made subjects of the symbolic flourishing of imagination which reduces the 
motley lived world into a set of animal representations concocted by humans. 
Instead, they remain abjects, the out-casts, the thrown-downs. It is that which 
zoosemiotics, biosemiotics, animal studies, and to a small extent this thesis too 
should attempt to remedy. 
 
 
Posthumanism 
An animal which could speak said: ‘Hu-
manity is a prejudice of which we animals 
at least are free.’  
–Friedrich Nietzsche (1997: 162) 
 
Even if speculative realism is now waning as a separate school or branch of 
philosophy, the mixture of unease, disappointment, and hope for a renewal in 
philosophy which gave rise to it continues to spread. For speculative realism is 
or was part and parcel with a number of other movements that proceed from the 
same basic recognition of, or perhaps boredom with, that very same, ex-
ceedingly familiar gesture which we just described, of reducing all knowledge 
to human representations, discourse, cultural frames, etc., and the resultant re-
jection, critique or questioning of this anthropocentric premise. Various ways of 
rethinking this basic premise of the human sciences go by many different 
names, mostly due to the current disciplinary fragmentation of these nascent 
approaches, with different fields coming up with their own particular theories to 
suit their own particular needs. They range from animal studies and bio- and 
zoosemiotics, to which this thesis lends its allegiance, to the academic-activist 
critical animal studies, to new materialisms, particularly of the feminist kind, to 
philosophies of immanence, to actor-network, affect, and assemblage theories, 
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to different strands of anti- and posthumanism, and various others.5 To a greater 
or lesser extent all these new humanities and philosophies of the Anthropocene  
 
criticise anthropocentrism, rethink subjectivity by playing up the role of in-
human forces within the human, emphasize the self-organizing powers of 
several nonhuman processes, explore dissonant relations between those pro-
cesses and cultural practice, rethink the sources of ethics, and commend the 
need to fold a planetary dimension more actively and regularly into studies of 
global, interstate and state politics. (Connolly 2013: 399) 
 
Since many if not most of these various theories, movements, and conceptions 
critique, decenter, displace, and rethink either certain humanist values and 
beliefs or, more importantly, the metaphysical ideal of humanist subjectivity, a 
convenient umbrella term for them would be “posthumanism”.6 Since there is 
no coherent disciplinary identity shared by all these forms of thinking, post-
humanism is far from being the accepted general term, but it will serve us as a 
shorthand in the present context, denoting a sort of postanthropocentric desire, 
in Stefan Herbrechter’s (2018: 95) memorable phrase. 
Despite appearances, posthumanism does not refer to any kind of radically 
new conception, of an overcoming or surpassing of a previous era. It is an un-
settling and a reconfiguration. Much like Bruno Latour’s moderns whom we 
have never been, posthumanism names a similar situation in which we recog-
nize our always-already imbrication with the nonhuman, but also a dislocation 
of the legacy of humanism as a historically specific mode of thought. Post-
humanism refers to a crisis, a renewed interest in, or a forceful appearance of 
certain ideas that have long lingered in Western thought and which have recent-
ly, over the past decade or two, burst to the forefront, fuelled by the recognition 
of and disappointment with endlessly repeated anthropocentrisms. In this sense, 
for the purposes of this thesis, posthumanism should not to be confused with 
transhumanism and the concept of the post-human found within that entirely 
different movement. Transhumanism is an eschatological and soteriological 
brand of hyper-humanism, the goal of which is to fulfil Enlightenment dreams 
and values through technological enhancement of the human mind and body, 
accompanied with the hopeful construction or arrival of the post-human (or the 
singularity, or similar quasi-religious events or entities) which would transform 
mankind and transport it to a new, unknowable “stage” of development. It is an 
attempt to “immanentize the eschaton,” in Erich Voegelin’s famous phrase. It 
                                                            
5  Literature on these movements and theories is vast, and most are not pertinent for the 
present context. Among those which are, see for animal studies DeMello 2012; Cederholm et 
al 2014, for zoosemiotics, Maran et al. 2011; Martinelli 2010; Kull 2014, for posthumanism 
in the sense used in this thesis, see e.g. Braidotti 2013; Braidotti, Hlavajova 2018; Nayar 
2014; Wolfe 2003, 2010. For a recent juxtaposition of animal studies and the concept of the 
Anthropocene, see Tønnessen et al. 2016. 
6  Another such prominent umbrella term today is New Materialism, see Coole, Frost 2010; 
Tuin, Dolphijn 2012; Bennett 2010.  
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should be noted, however, that the thorny issues relating the fusion of techno-
logy and technological mediation with questions of the “nature” or “essence” of 
man is found in that style of posthumanism which is described herein as well. 
The posthumanist focus in such debates, however, is that of decentring or 
dislocating human reason or subjectivity from the self-assured centrality it is 
afforded in humanist discourse, of which transhumanism is part. “In the post-
human era many beliefs become redundant – not least the belief in human 
beings” declares what is possibly the most trenchant manifesto of this kind of 
technological but anti-transhumanist posthumanism (containing, in fact, a literal 
posthumanist manifesto): Robert Pepperell’s The Posthuman Condition (2003: 
177), the motto of which illustrates this attitude perfectly:  
 
Humanists saw themselves as distinct beings in an antagonistic relationship 
with their surroundings. Posthumans, on the other hand, regard their own being 
as embodied in an extended technological world. (ibid., 187) 
 
In brief, the purpose of posthumanist discourse as understood here is to dis-
locate, decentre, and deconstruct the idea(l)s of human transcendence and 
exceptionalism which is the hallmark of humanism and the core of transhuma-
nism. In this respect, posthumanism is in all essentials the opposite of trans-
humanism.7 (For a classic critique, see Hayles 1999, but for a more relevant 
critique of transhumanism from the posthumanist perspective, see Marchesini 
2017: 137ff.) 
 Thus while posthumanism can and often does involve considerations of 
technology (e.g. Stiegler 1998), its basic point of departure and object of 
critique is humanism as a set of ideas and ideals. This must be clarified, for 
humanism, a nebulous concept of longstanding history (its origin lies in the 
supposed overcoming of the dogmatic ignorance of the medieval era during the 
Renaissance) has been involved in and accused of almost everything over the 
past half a millennium of the concept’s existence, from philosophy, liberatory 
politics and education, to literature and the arts, all the way to fascism and 
genocide.8 (For a convenient overview of the antics and escapades of the 
concept of “humanism” over the centuries, see Davies 1997). 
 The faults of which humanism has been accused are numerous. That it failed 
to do anything more substantial than scratch off the word God from Christian 
ethics and replace it with “universal mankind” while leaving everything else 
intact is a familiar one (e.g. Ehrenfeld 1981). That it is scarcely more than 
another name for anthropocentrism, with its focus, in the name of human 
                                                            
7  The concepts “post-human” and “posthumanism”, used in this manner as a confused 
mixture of the critique of the anthropocentric ideology of humanism, and as commentary on 
the new post-human condition in a technologically mediated society, are not new or novel. 
They were already present in philosophical discourse in the 1950s–1960s. See Greif 2015: 
324–325. 
8  “In the innermost recesses of humanism, as its very soul, there rages a frantic prisoner 
who, as a Fascist, turns the world into a prison” (Adorno 2005: 89). 
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universality, on human ends, values, and dignity to the detriment of all others 
(not just nonhuman animals, but many a human collective as well, both 
historically and today) is another – or perhaps another variation of the previous 
one. But we will leave to others to decide on the merits of these critiques, for in 
the confines of this thesis we are interested in critiques of humanism from the 
specifically posthumanist and animal studies viewpoint. Roberto Marchesini 
provides us with a handy list of characteristics of what he calls the “Vitruvian 
model,” the humanist figure “who enters the world and shapes it, dictating its 
metrics and morphology” (2018: 26). In the humanist conception, “man” places 
itself at the centre, it is centripetal; enhances its being as an essence, therefore 
its purity; considers technology as an instrument of domination; regards itself as 
a technical manufacturer, the Promethean human forging the world; and be-
lieves itself to be self-sufficient, autopoietic, and thinkable iuxta propria prin-
cipia [on its own principles] (ibid, 145–146). It is a figure who in order to 
constitute itself turns its back on alterity, and thinks itself the fons et origo of all 
that is worth knowing. 
Posthumanism, to the contrary, in its very basic core describes how what we 
call “human” is bound up with all sorts of forces and factors that aren’t really 
“human” at all, such as our “animal” biological inheritance and how it shapes 
our emotions, our behaviour, our needs and wants; our ecological embedded-
ness as creatures of evolution in a web of life, our use of so-called “external 
prosthetics” such as culture and language, and so on. We are, and always have 
been, constituted by something – actually, many “somethings” – that we are not. 
The core ideas and basic premises of posthumanism have perhaps best and most 
eloquently articulated by Cary Wolfe in his What is Posthumanism? (2010). 
Here he summarises posthumanism as follows: 
 
“we” are always radically other, already in- or ahuman in our very being – not 
just in the evolutionary, biological, and zoological fact of our physical vul-
nerability and mortality, our mammalian existence but also in our subjection to 
and constitution in the materiality and technicity of a language that is always 
on the scene before we are, as a precondition of our subjectivity. (Wolfe 2010: 
89) 
 
And as such, he continues in a different context, we must 
 
attend to the specificity of the human – its ways of being in the world, its ways 
of knowing, observing, and describing – by (paradoxically, for humanism) 
acknowledging that it is fundamentally a prosthetic creature that has coevolved 
with various forms of technicity and materiality, forms that are radically “not-
human” and yet have nevertheless made the human what it is. (ibid, xxv) 
  
32 
For the posthumanist philosopher who takes epistemology as their basic object 
of interest, as philosophers are wont to do, the crisis of humanism is that of its 
conception of the knowing subject. It is a conception of subjectivity which is 
self-transparent to itself, and which practices a sort of benevolent dominion over 
its “objects” of knowledge. In this conception, the knowing subject incorporates 
these objects into its own regimes of knowledge precisely as objects, which as 
such provide no challenge or feedback to that regime itself, that is, it incorpo-
rates them without destabilizing or throwing into question the schema of human 
subjectivity that underlies it. This, it should be said, is the humanist ideal and as 
such dissimilar to practices of knowledge as they actually function (as has been 
amply demonstrated by Science and Technology Studies); the ideal has also 
been thoroughly deconstructed by post-structuralist critiques of subjectivity (cf. 
Cadavra et al. 1991). Posthumanism, too, joins the fray: 
 
The full force of animal studies, then, resides in its power to remind us that it is 
not enough to reread and reinterpret – from a safe ontological distance, as it 
were [… A]s long as it leaves unquestioned the humanist schema of the 
knowing subject who undertakes such a reading, then it sustains the very 
humanism and anthropocentrism that animal studies sets out to question. 
(Wolfe 2009: 569) 
 
In this thesis we are concerned with nonhuman animals and their depiction and 
denigration in philosophical texts. As should be clear from the above, however, 
posthumanism in itself is not limited to “the question of the animal”, but rather 
pertains to all attention paid to the non- or inhuman forces and phenomena that 
have a constitutive effect on human and nonhuman lives, such as, for example, 
technology studies, disability studies, affect studies, and many others. As such, 
it is indeed yet another “new name for some old ways of thinking”, as William 
James once called pragmatism. But it is in conjunction with nonhuman animals 
that posthumanism is most trenchant in its critique of all things humanist, and 
perhaps best poised to put into practice that erasure of man so famously pro-
phesied by Michel Foucault. It has even been argued that the “recent concern 
with animals or ‘the animal’ may be the latest if not the ultimate form of […] 
anti-humanism” (Berger, Segarra 2011: 3), and if so, then this ultimate anti-
humanism was inaugurated in semiotics and by zoosemiotics, in the form of 
Jakob von Uexküll’s (1957) famous tick, “which certainly constitutes a high 
point of modern antihumanism”, this at least according to Giorgio Agamben’s 
perhaps not entirely unironic remark (2004: 45). 
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Anthropomorphism 
Presumption is our natural and original 
disease. The most wretched and frail of all 
creatures is man, and withal the proudest. 
[…] How does he know, by the strength of 
his understanding, the secret and internal 
motions of animals? and from what com-
parison betwixt them and us does he 
conclude the stupidity he attributes to them? 
–Montaigne (1910: 224) 
 
Yet another habitual tactic of denying nonhuman animals a place of conside-
ration in human affairs is by way of anthropomorphism. Now, anthropocentrism 
also plays such a role, and is the more encompassing term. But presently we are 
not interested in that more straightforward human-centeredness, for it is part and 
parcel of humanist thinking, and as such its critique is part of general post-
humanist critique, treated above. Anthropomorphism, or rather the accusation of 
having engaged in it, is a much more subtle denial, particularly because it is 
often presented as a reasonable, scientific standpoint, a guard against too hasty 
projections of human characteristics to nonhuman animals. 
Both anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism have been widely discussed 
in academic literature, giving rise to countless papers, and several prominent 
collections (e.g. Boddice 2011; Daston, Mitman 2005; Mitchell, Thompson, 
Miles 1997). Anthropomorphism is usually defined as an attribution of cogni-
tive or emotional states to non-human animals, or the use of human characte-
ristics to describe or explain the behaviour of nonhuman animals. Such a defi-
nition is rather coarse. A convenient explication and classification of various 
possible types of anthropomorphism is handily provided by John Fisher (1996: 
7).9 Let us briefly summarize those types which are relevant for the present 
discussion. In brief, anthropomorphism is the case where conclusions are drawn 
from the behaviour of an animal to the mental or emotional state of that animal. 
It is a situation where an observed behaviour on part of a particular animal is 
interpreted, and provided with an explanatory basis, by referring to alleged 
mental states of that creature, which presumably caused the animal to behave 
the way it did. Such attributions may take the form of conferring intentionality 
to animals (e.g. the cat is playing) or of simply ascribing emotional states to 
them (e.g. the chimpanzee is happy).  
Now, following that old scholastic adage that whenever you meet a contra-
diction you must make a distinction, we should begin by dividing anthropo-
morphism into what might be called the situational and the categorical version.  
                                                            
9  Fisher draws a technical distinction between anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism. 
An antrhopocentrist in this context is not merely one who refuses to ascribe human-like 
attributes to nonhuman animals (a matter of empirical studies), but one who holds that any 
such attribution is ipso facto a fallacy. For our present less technical discussion this 
distinction can be elided. 
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Situational anthropomorphism refers to those instances where we make a 
mistaken inference about an animal’s mental or emotional state that never-
theless could be true in other contexts or other circumstances. For example, a 
chimpanzee might bare its teeth as a sign of anger or threat, and we misinterpret 
it as a smile, or as a sign of affection. In this instance, we are mistaken and the 
chimp is in fact angry, but this obviously does not rule out, in principle, that the 
ape cannot be happy in other times and circumstances. It is a context and 
situation-specific mistake, and not a principled one. 
What we are actually interested in here is categorical anthropomorphism, the 
stance that the attribution of mental or emotional states to animals that can 
never, in any context or circumstance, ever be valid. That is, relative to a parti-
cular kind of creature, it is always a mistake to attribute certain kinds of mental 
states to this kind of creature. It is a mistake in principle, supposedly amounting 
to committing a category mistake. This is essentially the original sense of 
‘anthropomorphism’, already hinted at in Xenophanes’ famous passage, where 
in reference to gods he famously declares that 
 
if oxen (and horses) and lions had hands or could draw with hands and create 
works of art like those made by men, horses would draw pictures of gods like 
horses, and oxen of gods like oxen, and they would make the bodies (of their 
gods) in accordance with the form that each species itself possesses. (quoted in 
Spada 1997: 38) 
 
Now, one could justifiably assume that categorical anthropomorphism is the 
rarer of the two, not to be found very often in literature, and as such there would 
not be much need for critics to attack this position. One would be wrong. For 
according to Fisher, critics – whom he calls by way of analogy “hard anthro-
pocentrists” – generally assume that categorical anthropomorphism is the 
default mistake: that attributions of mental states to nonhuman animals are 
always necessarily wrong. Moreover, here we arrive at the one aspect that is of 
interest for us: its use as an accusation, a purported fallacy, “an embarrassment 
to be avoided” (ibid, 3). It is indeed yet another example of line-drawing 
between humans and animals; it is to be deplored, and avoided at all cost. Fisher 
provides a series of telling examples: “Attributions of intentions and beliefs to 
animals smack of anthropomorphism”; “I see nothing at all anthropomorphic or 
in any other way absurd in saying that…”; “this smacks of anthropomorphism, 
anathema to today’s nature writers” (quoted in Fisher 1996: 3, 6). Sometimes 
the hyperbole is whipped up to highly emotional levels. Anthropomorphism has 
been called dangerous, an incubus from which the field of ethology must 
struggle to free itself, an incurable disease, which has no place in a scientific 
study, it is uncritical, naïve and sloppy (quotes from Horowitz, Bekoff 2007: 
30) and that “it has taken many centuries to achieve the present measure of 
emancipation from vitalism and anthropomorphism” (quoted in Mitchell, 
Thompson, Miles 1997: 24). Horowitz and Bekoff are indeed left to conclude 
that “in studies of animal behavior, there is near official consensus about 
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anthropomorphizing: it is to be avoided” and that its “accepted status” is that of 
a “fundamentally flawed way to describe nonhuman animal behavior” (2007: 
23–24). One is reminded of a quote from Blaise Pascal: “How comes it that a 
cripple does not offend us, but that a fool does? Because a cripple recognizes 
that we walk straight, whereas a fool declares that it is we who are silly; if it 
were not so, we should feel pity and not anger” (Pascal, Pensées, §80).  
Here we can see the strong grip of dimension 2 (animals are lacking) and 
soon enough, dimension 4 (distinction is mental) from our list of six dimen-
sions, as presented at the beginning of this introduction. At the pain of repetition 
(but repeat we must, for outside of animal studies this is still all too common): 
This accusation indeed represents one of the many devices used in depicting 
human beings as fundamentally distinct from the rest of nature, as being 
qualitatively different. It is one way of depicting the rest of the living world as 
mere background, existing solely for the purpose of figuring as an undistin-
guished mass from which uniquely human characteristics are supposed to stand 
apart. In this “shallow” picture of human beings’ place in nature, “humans are 
perceived as the significant figures against a ground that only assumes signi-
ficance in so far as it enhances humans’ images of themselves qua important 
figures” (Fox 2003: 252).  
As such, the accusation of anthropomorphism functions as what may perhaps 
be called a hegemonic device, a non-coercive power circulating through dis-
cursive practices (Lears 1985). The use of anthropomorphism as an accusation 
functions as a sort of a silent influencer that attempts to determine, in advance 
of any actual empirical research and proper articulations, what can be thought 
about and how it can be thought about. It limits and directs arguments in such a 
manner that they should start, as their primary condition, with a fundamental 
separation between humans and all other animals. The “null hypothesis”, so to 
speak, is human exceptionalism. The accusation tries to inhibit the conside-
ration of certain possible positions, and is particularly pernicious for philo-
sophical or theoretical work. 
There is a further discursive mechanism, or perhaps it ought to be called a 
rhetorical bait and switch, by which nonhuman animals are expelled from philo-
sophic discourse by the mechanism of inclusive exclusion. This time it begins 
by admitting that many nonhuman animals in fact do have capacities which 
were formerly denied to them. The bait is the admission of a characteristic (say, 
capacity for surprise), and the switch is a version of self-awareness. That is to 
say, when it is discovered that some nonhuman animals do indeed have some 
characteristic that was previously thought of as uniquely human, the human 
version of said characteristic is re-described through human self-awareness of 
said trait. So perhaps animals are also symbol-users, but humans are aware that 
they are symbol users. Perhaps animals are rational in their behaviour, but hu-
mans are aware that they themselves are rational. The uniquely human version 
of any such capacity is animal capacity + awareness of capacity. 
This tactic is exceedingly commonplace. Nevertheless, a few examples are 
in order. In traditional metaphysics, this is the thought process that undergirds 
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the differentiation between perception and apperception. Thus Leibniz writes 
that  
 
it is good to distinguish between perception, which is the internal state of the 
monad representing external things, and apperception, which is consciousness, 
or the reflective knowledge of this internal state, something not given to all 
souls, nor at all times to a given soul. (1989: 208) 
 
And it is precisely this capacity for apperception that distinguishes, for Leibniz, 
“beasts” from “rational animals”, the former of which are only capable of per-
ceiving situational facts and remembering the consequences of effects, whereas 
the latter are capable of “true reasoning” about causes, of immaterial things and 
truths, because the souls or minds of rational animals are “capable of perfor-
ming reflective acts, and capable of considering what is called “I”, substance, 
soul, mind” (ibid, 209). 
As we already saw above, this is also the line taken by Heidegger in his “as-” 
structure, in which animals fail to see things as-such, but only as they engage 
them in their everyday activities, all the while for Dasein they are open to per-
ception X-as-X. Similarly, in semiotics, this same line is taken by John Deely: 
“Animals make use of signs without knowing that there are signs” (Deely 1990: 
36), but the “human animal [is] the only animal that, besides making and 
making use of signs, knows that there are signs” (Deely 2001: 736–737; for 
further discussion on Deely, see Rattasepp, Kull 2016, the second paper 
included in this thesis). Many more examples can easily be found. 
Such a meta-level self-indication is often not obvious, however. Here is a 
somewhat more complex example of this tactic. In his Problems of Rationality 
(2004: 135–149) Donald Davidson first argues that beliefs depend on the 
capacity to categorize. Then, taking note that some nonhuman animals are 
indeed also capable of categorization (ibid, 135), he shifts the criterion to the 
capacity for surprise. Thus, according to Davidson, there are no beliefs unless 
there is the capacity to be surprised when a belief turns out to be false. Having 
beliefs depends in this case on the capacity of having meta-thoughts: thoughts 
about thinking. As such, a belief about the state of affairs in the world is not 
sufficient for having a “true” belief. Instead, one must first be able to have a 
belief about the state of affairs in the world, then a situation where the belief 
turns out to be mistaken, with surprise following from this tension between 
prior thought and the new thought about that thought, brought about by a 
surprising mismatch between belief and reality. And only if one is capable of 
this kind of a train of mental states and emotions does one have “true” beliefs. 
In this example, “surprise”, the meta-thought about thought, functions as the 
switch from the bait of categorization. (For further commentary on this, cf. 
Bortolotti 2008.) And, as ever, goalposts are shifted in this manner for the 
purpose of denying that any nonhuman animals could have beliefs. And, as 
ever, issues are not solved empirically, but by an a priori redefinition the 
concept. Animals are expelled by fiat. 
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Maieutics and perspectivism 
Probably the most frequently asked question from anyone who explains that 
they are engaged in umwelt studies, or are interested in the subjective worlds of 
nonhuman animals in general, is something along the lines of “but how do you 
get access to these subjective worlds?” For indeed, as has been endlessly 
debated by philosophers of mind and cognition, there is the famous “hard 
problem” (Chalmers 1995) of third person access to first person experiences. 
This question extends to access to nonhuman subjective umwelts as well, for 
what would it mean to study the subjective umwelts of nonhumans in a situation 
where the actual object of study is inaccessible? We don’t even have access, so 
the story goes, to even the inner worlds of other humans, and it is immeasurably 
more difficult to even imagine what the umwelt would be of a creature entirely 
unlike ourselves. We have never been and thus can never know how it feels to 
be a bat, as probably the most famous formulation of the issue goes (Nagel 
1974): so what is it that we are studying in the first place? 
 When faced with this question, I am often tempted – and often fail the temp-
tation – of noting that in a similar vein no physicist has ever been an elementary 
particle, and no sociologist has ever been a society, yet this is not thought of 
being a hindrance to research. What is fascinating here is not really the question 
itself (of how to be a nonhuman), but some of the reasons why this feels like a 
relevant, even common-sense and immediate question to ask. It is as if the stars 
and atoms are so distant or so unreachable, and societies with their institutions 
so generic or abstract or so far from anything animate (despite the fact that we 
systematically project agency to social phenomena) that such a question sounds 
positively bizarre. We find ourselves in a peculiar position of thinking that the 
distant stars and the generalized models of social institutions are in some sense 
close and understandable for us and thus amenable to straightforward research, 
whereas nonhuman animals, many of whom are so similar to us that we find it 
very easy to attribute all sorts of emotional states and beliefs to them, are as if 
so distant and alien to us that the question “how can we even come to know 
their umwelt?” seems to be unanswerable. What is beyond our experience has 
been brought to the forefront, and the closeness of animals has been pushed 
away. What has happened that the distant and the abstract feel close and ob-
vious, but the closeness of animals gives rise to incredulity? 
 In his despondent and melancholy essay Why look at animals? (1980: 1–26), 
the great art critic John Berger mourns the loss of attachment and contact with 
nonhuman animals in today’s urbanised world. What has happened, or so he 
argues (and I am hesitant in using this poetic essay as a source for substantial 
claims), is that the more we lose close contact with animals, the more they are 
relegated to zoos and distant, managed wildernesses, the more we have been 
searching for surrogates and replacements for this irreparable loss. Once again 
we are back at animals who are in a state of perpetual vanishing. The more 
animals withdraw from everyday life, the more we attempt to bring them back 
through the usage of various surrogates (zoos, toys, and animal imagery). It is 
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not simply the case that we don’t have access to nonhuman umwelts for some 
technical reasons or for because of the puzzlement of philosophers, but because 
we have effectively marginalized them, and pushed them aside: 
 
That look between animal and man, which may have played a crucial role in 
the development of human society, and with which, in any case, all men had 
always lived until less than a century ago, has been extinguished. […] As for 
the crowds [i.e. humans], they belong to a species which has at last been 
isolated. (Berger 1980: 26) 
 
So perhaps the issue is not just how to solve the hard problem of access to first 
person subjectivity. Perhaps there is also a need for something like an ethos, an 
imperative perhaps of research conduct that could guide us as we go forward in 
our studies in zoosemiotics. One possible avenue is laid down for use by the 
principle of maieutics, as reformulated by Mark Greif (2015: 24–26) and a non-
human version of perspectivism which Eduardo Viveiros de Castro first formu-
lated in his studies of Amerindian ontology (Viveiros de Castro 2014). 
Maieutics, technē maieutikē, “the art of midwifery” (Theaetetus 150b), is an 
old Socratic concept; in fact, in translations it is often rendered straightfor-
wardly as the famous Socratic or dialectical method. This famous method is, let 
us recall, not merely, as is so often supposed, a way of reaching the truth (or at 
least concord) through debate and dialogue. Rather, in Theaetetus and several 
other dialogues, Socrates provides the prodding questions yet provides no 
answers himself, helping others come to their conclusions of their own accord. 
Socrates is merely the midwife, helping others to deliver their newly discovered 
knowledge yet claiming none to himself. The method of maieutics, of mid-
wifery is one which “by insistent and forceful questioning, seeks to bring into 
being and bring to birth in another person answers that will reward the questio-
ner’s own belief in the character of the universal capacity for thinking” (Greif 
2015: 24).  
From this we can draw an imperative, a “should”. At the core of this ethos 
lies in an acceptance of the impossibility of providing definitive answers, but 
which for this very reason is an imperative to a discourse regardless of its ability 
to solve or determine an inquiry; it would be a call to provide ideas and con-
ceptions that are valuable to bring out and articulate, even without the certitude 
of them being correct: 
 
Maieutics are shoulds in discourse or within the intellectual life that help to say 
what must be addressed or talked about, what stands up as a serious or pro-
found question or contribution, regardless of its ability to solve or determine an 
inquiry. (ibid, 25) 
 
To paraphrase a famous quote, whereof one cannot speak, thereof everything 
must be said. And the “shoulds” of the maieutic that we then ought to follow is 
threefold. First there is the attitude taken towards oneself: maieutics “makes you 
work on yourself and your own thought, midwife to something that lies inside 
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you and would be valuable to bring out and articulate even if you are in no wise 
“correct.”” (ibid.). Second, there is the effect on others, an imperative to arise in 
others the same sort of need to “say everything” in the face of uncertainty, with 
the purpose that “another will undertake the task of speaking, thus doing some-
thing to himself and to the listening (or reading) public.” (ibid, 26). And finally, 
the overarching goal is to reach “the discourse that we can see emerges in 
furnishing a should to a range of speakers, irresolvably” (ibid.). 
 What would this mean for zoosemiotics, animal studies, for the broad philo-
sophical discourse on nonhuman animals? Only some generalities can be pro-
vided here. The first thing to conclude is, of course, to put the above three 
principles into actual practice: that the inaccessibility of umwelts to direct expe-
rience should foment and instigate more discussions, more research, more 
imaginative answers despite (and even contrary to good academic standards) 
their validity or their basis on empirical research. But we should not go too far 
along this path. Rather, let us ask, what kind of thought should be spurred in this 
situation where nonhuman animals are systematically rejected, described as 
lacking, and as forming a homogeneous background from which human unique-
ness should stand out. And the short answer is that, whatever the methods we 
may or may not develop for further research, we must take umwelts seriously as 
a plurality of ontologies. For if we were to follow this imperative to always 
think otherwise, to subsume to this “should” of talking in ever more creative 
forms, we must understand and consider the diversity of all life, the differences 
between species, and their own being as individuals; we must understand their 
multiplicity, diversity, difference; and we must place ourselves face to face with 
the alterity and singularity of nonhuman animals, under the gaze of an alien 
being. As Nietzsche once put it,  
 
I think that today we are at least far away from the ridiculous immodesty of 
decreeing from our angle that perspectives are permitted only from this angle. 
Rather, the world has once again become infinite to us: insofar as we cannot 
reject the possibility that it includes infinite interpretations. (2001: 239) 
 
We should, however, make some remarks as to what, in broad strokes, this 
ontological perspectivism is. In his Cannibal Metaphysics, Viveiros de Castro 
calls for “a permanent decolonization of thought” (2014: 40), the purpose of 
which is to “make multiplicities proliferate” (ibid, 45). While originally this was 
a call for a more fundamental understanding of the ontologies of different 
human cultures, and was targeted against the presumption of treating Western 
naturalism as the basis on which others can be grounded and explained, it could 
perhaps be fruitfully extended to cover the nonhuman umwelts as well. Such a 
comparative ontology of umwelts would take the descriptions of ontological 
self-determination or grounding of nonhumans in parallel with our own more 
familiar one(s), resulting in a perpetual reworking of our own human umwelts, 
ontologies, and their descriptions. It would be a nonhuman animal variant of 
what Viveiros de Castro has described as the “ontological determination of 
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ethnographic alterity, the elucidation of the terms of the ‘ontological self-deter-
mination of the other’” (2015: 4), in which the researcher takes the position not 
of a monopolistic analyst of objects of study, but takes as fundamental the se-
miosic agency of the nonhumans, thereby “forcing the analyst to confront the 
unexpectedly powerful speculative forces that spring from the actors, far more 
philosophically-minded (in a broad sense) than we normally take them to be” 
(ibid, 6). This would amount to placing the agential nonhuman umwelts on an 
equal footing to ours, letting our own ontological assumptions to be “counter-
analyzed”, as it were, which would have the effect of making ourselves more 
alien and “returns to us an image in which we are unrecognizable to ourselves” 
(Maniglier, cited in Viveiros de Castro 2014: 41). Perhaps there is a possibility, 
remote and of idle imagination it may turn out to be, of finding ourselves in a 
strange state which Bruno Latour once described in his stupendously original, 
underappreciated philosophical tractatus called Irreductions: 
 
I don’t know how things stand. I know neither who I am nor what I want, but 
others say they know on my behalf, others, who define me, link me up, make 
me speak, interpret what I say, and enroll me. Whether I am a storm, a rat, a 
rock, a lake, a lion, a child, a worker, a gene, a slave, the unconscious, or a 
virus, they whisper to me, they suggest, they impose an interpretation of what I 
am and what I could be. (Latour 1988: 192) 
 
Such would be the combination of maieutics and perspectivism, of comparative 
ontology, where every good model would not just be a model of a passive 
object (or even a subject, for the reification of subjectivity into a static entity is 
all too common, particularly in the case of nonhumans), but a model which 
would be at least partially a version of the nonhuman umwelt, an elision of the 
distinction between the object-level and metal-level, of the human and the 
nonhuman. Similarly to the plurality of ontologies described in anthropology’s 
ontological turn, such a comparative ontology of umwelts, a multispecies se-
miotics, would take as “fundamental that there are multiple, irreducible forms of 
thought [in our case, umwelts] that all count as ontology” (Charbonnier et al. 
2016: 3) and which then would be 
 
a way of postulating a horizontal plane on which different, noncompossible 
ways of composing a world that are actualized by collectives can be related, 
rather than the old vertical search for a foundation – and thus a reduction – of 
one such composition to another. (ibid., 4) 
 
Whether such a thing is possible I do not know. But I do believe that 
 
We need another and a wiser and perhaps a more mystical concept of animals. 
[…] We patronize them for their incompleteness, for their tragic fate for having 
taken form so far below ourselves. And therein do we err. For the animal shall 
not be measured by man. In a world older and more complete than ours, they 
move finished and complete, gifted with the extension of the senses we have 
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lost or never attained, living by voices we shall never hear. They are not 
brethren, they are not underlings: they are other nations, caught with ourselves 
in the net of life and time, fellow prisoners of the splendour and travail of the 
earth. (Beston 1992: 24–25) 
 
Maybe the time is ripe for animal exceptionalism? 
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THE CHATTERING OF FICTIONS,  
THE SILENCE OF REALITY 
Since the final paper included in this thesis was published in Estonian, this sub-
chapter provides a brief summary of relevant parts of it. This paper and the pre-
vious one, A Metaphysic for Semiotics, are two more general treatments which 
function as accompanying pieces to the first three. While A Metaphysic for Se-
miotics suggests certain considerations of and concepts suitable as general prin-
ciples for studying nonhumans, this paper provides a more general historical 
background concerning a “two worlds” metaphysics which lies at the core of 
any rigid distinction between humans and nonhumans. The “two worlds” of this 
philosophical picture are, of course, culture and nature. I have in mind that very 
worldview, so much criticized today and during the past decades, of the media-
tion of nature by culture, on which “the world is culturally constructed” stance 
is predicated upon.  
 The paper itself is a historical overview of the genesis of that stance, and 
since this history has often been told, it need not be repeated here. Thus what 
follows are certain excerpts from it which are more pertinent to the general 
theme of this thesis. In general, the original paper followed Latour’s claim that 
over the course of the past few centuries, the distinction between nature and 
culture has increasingly become more radical, moving from the classic starting 
point of distinction between mind and world, to their separation, then contra-
diction, all the way to complete incommensurability (Latour 1993: 58). It was 
this historico-philosophical process which has led many a person think that a 
question such as “do you believe in reality?” is a substantial one to ask (Latour 
1999: 1–4). Which leads him to describe the two houses of being of the modern 
constitution, from which this paper takes its title:  
 
The first is the obscure room depicted by Plato, in which ignorant people find 
themselves in chains, unable to look directly at one another, communicating 
only via fictions projected on a sort of movie screen; the second is located 
outside, in a world made up not of humans but of nonhumans, indifferent to our 
quarrels, our ignorances, and the limits of our representations and fictions. 
 
[…] 
 
The first house brings together the totality of speaking humans, who find 
themselves with no power at all save that of being ignorant in common, or of 
agreeing by convention to create fictions devoid of any external reality. The 
second house is constituted exclusively of real objects that have the property of 
defining what exists but that lack the gift of speech. On the one hand, we have 
the chattering of fictions; on the other, the silence of reality. (Latour 2004: 13–
14) 
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Underneath all the historical attempts at bringing mind and nature, thinking and 
being back together, with the failure of such attempts pushing them increasingly 
apart, there lies what François Laruelle has called the Philosophical Decision 
(Brassier 2003). The philosophical decision proceeds from a cut or separation of 
two sides, a posited empirical datum (that which is to be conditioned), and a 
corresponding posited faktum (the specific conditions); the two are then sup-
posed form a synthetic unity, but a curious one which distinguishes and unites 
at the same time, being both immanent to the posited distinction, and simulta-
neously transcendent with respect to it as its condition of possibility. This is the 
disjoined conjunction, as it were, of noumena/phenomena, knower/known, virtual/ 
actual, and a multitude of others (ibid., 26; see also Snricek 2011: 166). As 
such, this philosophical Decision is the essence of correlationist thinking, 
already described above, and unsurprisingly it is once again the supposed 
human side that is the conditioning (i.e. meaning-making) part in this (dis)unity. 
 This process of radicalization of the (dis)unity has today left us in a situation 
where a lot of contemporary philosophy (mostly Continental) has turned away 
from any discussions of reality or materiality, but rather focuses entirely on lan-
guage games, representations, cultural categories, narratives, and the like. A 
paradigmatic example of thought’s elopement from the world into an “alterna-
tive view” of self-professed insularity is Jürgen Habermas: “the paradigm of the 
knowledge of objects has to be replaced by the paradigm of mutual under-
standing between subjects capable of speech and action”, based on a “model of 
unconstrained consensus formation in a communication community” (1987: 
295–6, naturally, by communication community Habermas means humans 
only). Thus have we arrived at present times: to understand the world is to see 
how people talk to people. 
 The above pertains mostly to philosophy. In the social sciences and the 
humanities, there was a parallel track, which amounted to the replacement of 
subjectivity with culture, but retaining the philosophical Veil of Maya meta-
physics, with mental representations replaced with impersonal cultural ones.10 
Already Durkheim made the distinction between the experiential world and the 
world of representations or concepts, the latter of which stop the flow of expe-
rience and structure it. Such concepts, however, are of a particular kind: 
 
the nature of the concept bespeaks its origin. It is common to all because it is 
the work of the community. It does not bear the imprint of any individual 
intellect, since it is fashioned by a single intellect in which all the others meet 
[i.e. society]. (Durkheim 1995: 435) 
 
And with Durkheim’s claim that concepts “correspond to the way in which the 
special being that is society thinks about the things of its own experience” 
(ibid., 437), we once again see the idea of the transcendence of the social out of 
                                                            
10 In semiotics, the Saussurean system of language which consists only of internal dis-
tinctions between signs, is very much part of this same legacy. 
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the world into a special realm of its own, now resplendent with experiences 
which this new entity has all of its own accord.  
 The “two worlds” metaphysics, then, is as follows: culture consists of trans-
missible representations, which are separated from actual practice; they are 
thought of as determining said practice; cognitive processes impose their stable 
set of categories upon the flux of sense experience, which itself is confusing 
because there can be nothing in nature that would itself have an active, agential 
impact on thinking; therefore there cannot be any actual, direct engagement 
with the environment, but only through the mediation of cultural representations 
concocted in the recesses of the human mind or society, but which do all the 
work in meaning-making. 
 Our basic philosophical intuitions or metaphysical premises direct us to the 
kinds of questions we ask and shape the form our answers must take. In the 
“two worlds” metaphysics, the basic question becomes the epistemological one 
of access to external reality, which I have sometimes called “philosophies of 
extrusion” (but which nowadays are more commonly known as “philosophies of 
access”, which I agree is a better name), because they all circle around how 
“far” into the supposed “external” realm can thought penetrate – if at all. In this 
general sense, many seemingly opposite strands of thinking start to seem simi-
lar, with the difference between the objectivist and the subjectivist, the realist 
and the relativist only amounting to how successful they think this access to or 
penetration into the external world is or can be. All are premised on the belief 
that, in Francis Wolff’s beautiful expression,  
 
we are locked up in language or in consciousness without being able to get out. 
In this sense, they have no outside. But in another sense, they are entirely 
turned towards the outside; they are the world’s window […] consciousness 
and language enclose the world within themselves only insofar as, conversely, 
they are entirely contained by it. We are in consciousness or language as in a 
transparent cage. Everything is outside, yet it is impossible to get out. (quoted 
in Meillassoux 2008: 6) 
 
Within this “two worlds” metaphysics there is a rather curious paradox, not 
perhaps in the sense of an aporia, but rather a puzzlement. For while the human 
meaning-making side is thought to be the constitutive part in any such thinking-
being relationship, it is nevertheless and at the same time the outside world that is 
actually “real”, for, as is well known, often repeated and therefore necessarily 
true, that the only objectively understood reality is mind-independent reality. All 
the representations of the mind or cultural categories are in the end mere illusions, 
despite at the same time being our only means of access to reality. Habermas 
turned upside down: now the only foundation and guarantor of knowledge is an 
insulated independence of the Real, and that reality is premised on the unreality of 
the observer: the more unreal the observer, the more real the world. It was this 
that Whitehead famously criticized in this The Concept of Nature (1920) as the 
“bifurcation of nature” into “two systems of reality”, which 
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in so far as they are real, are real in different senses. One reality would be the 
entities such as electrons which are the study of speculative physics. This 
would be the reality which is there for knowledge; although on this theory it is 
never known. For what is known is the other sort of reality, which is the byplay 
of the mind. Thus there would be two natures, one is the conjecture and the 
other is the dream. (Whitehead 2015: 21) 
 
These are some of the elements, then, which are pertinent for the present thesis. 
I have omitted here the full historical detail and sources from the original paper. 
It forms the background from which the present-day posthumanities, new mate-
rialism, animal studies, and the like stand out, with their flat ontologies and the 
agency of things. The motto for these new ways of thinking should perhaps be 
Latour’s principle of irreducibility: “Nothing is, by itself, either reducible or 
irreducible to anything else” (1988: 158). In the flat, irreducible ontology, every 
thing, every phenomenon would be itself and would stand for itself, yet always 
together with others, for in the principle of irreducibility, the emphasis is on “by 
itself”. Nothing could be cast aside as mere context, substance, form, property; 
everything would be concrete and immanent and nothing would transcend 
actuality. Or as Latour himself describes it in a “pseudoautobiographical” 
interlude:  
 
It was a wintry sky, and a very blue. I no longer needed to prop it up with a 
cosmology, put it in a picture, render it in writing, measure it in a meteorologi-
cal article, or place it on a Titan to prevent it falling on my head. I added it to 
other skies in other places and reduced none of them to it, and it to none of 
them. It "stood at arm's length," fled, and established itself where it alone 
defined its place and its aims, neither knowable nor unknowable. It and me, 
them and us, we mutually defined ourselves. And for the first time in my life I 
saw things unreduced and set free. (ibid., 163) 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis is an exercise in ground-clearing. It is an attempt to take apart and 
bring to the open certain premises and assumptions which make large swathes 
of traditional philosophy inimical to substantial consideration of all things non-
human. More precisely, even if they consider the nonhuman, the fact that the 
nonhuman could consider them and that there are conclusions and self-critique 
to be derived from this, has been essentially inconceivable for most strands of 
philosophy up until very recent times. But umwelt studies, multispecies semio-
tics is precisely that: a study of nonhuman animals that is always open to the 
possibility that a comparison between the lived world of particular nonhumans 
and our conceptions of them may in fact lead to substantial questioning or 
revision of our concepts and ideas which we cherish the most, and have thought 
of as stable, well-defined, and universal. Multispecies semiotics is a questioning 
of human beliefs, ideas, and habits through the perspective of nonhumans, who 
represent not a lack, but worlds with their own specificity and difference. From 
this perspective, there is no single, specific relation that humans have with the 
world, nor one which humans would have with nonhumans, and those between 
all the nonhumans themselves. The world is motley, and humans should not be 
conceived of having a unitary, uniquely privileged or constitutive relation to it 
that would subsume all others (even if that relation comes just in the form of 
representations). That, at least, is its ideal. But in order to conduct such re-
search, we must first understand why we have not been conducting such 
research, or at least have not been conducting it as substantially and thoroughly 
as perhaps we should and could have been. And to explicate some of the 
reasons for this is the purpose of this thesis. 
 This thesis owes a lot to that mainstay and classic of today’s animal studies 
and posthumanities, Jacques Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am (2008). 
By far the most impactful book to be published for these fields, the literature on 
this text is overwhelming.11 It is indeed Derrida who most forcefully articulates 
the entire basis and substance of the present thesis. Most importantly for the 
present context, among all the philosophers who have discussed animals, ani-
mality, and nonhuman alterity in general, he most forcefully rejected any sort of 
representationalism. If the basic theme of this thesis is to ask and then critique 
how philosophers talk about animals, we must also be mindful of and attend 
critically to the general focus on representations – on human representations in 
the philosophical sense anyway, as hidden replicas of the world tucked away in 
the recesses of the mind (here multispecies semiotics joins forces with radical 
enactivism with its representation and content-free approaches to cognition; cf. 
Hutto, Myin 2017, Menary 2006). For one of the most basic and essential goals 
of contemporary philosophy of the past three hundred years or so, roughly 
                                                            
11  See, for example, just some of the book-length dispatches on this text and the subsequent 
one on similar themes, the two-part The Beast and the Sovereign (2011): Berger, Segara 
2011; Krell 2013; Lawlor 2007; Llored 2012. 
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starting from the classic triumvirate of Descartes, Locke, Kant, has been to be a 
general theory of representation. “The picture which holds traditional philo-
sophy captive is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing various repre-
sentations,” as Richard Rorty once put it, and “getting more accurate represen-
tations by inspecting, repairing, and polishing the mirror” is the basic task of 
philosophy (1979: 12). For philosophy as the mirror of nature, animals enter not 
as themselves as living beings with their own worlds and histories and modes of 
life, but as caught up in general theoretical and abstract issues for which they 
function as nothing but “a theme, trope, metaphor, analogy, representation, or 
sociological datum” or the like (Wolfe 2009: 567). These are Derrida’s animots, 
paper animals, abstract, inexistent. And it is this general premise of represen-
tational philosophies which is rejected by Derrida – as well as his many readers 
today, present author included. 
 
It is not just a matter of asking whether one has the right to refuse the animal 
such and such a power […]. It also means asking whether what calls itself 
human has the right rigorously to attribute to man, which means therefore to 
attribute to himself, what he refuses the animal, and whether he can ever 
possess the pure, rigorous, indivisible concept, as such, of that attribution. 
(Derrida 2008: 135, emphases in the original) 
 
The five papers included in this thesis are as follows. The first paper, The philo-
sophical discourse on animals, and the philosophical animals themselves 
(Rattasepp 2016) is the central one and explicates and expands the six-point list 
of the ways philosophers discuss animals when they are not discussing animals. 
It then draws out some of the conclusions of this self-centred isolation of hu-
mans into a sphere of meaning concocted entirely out of themselves, and instead 
suggests that we should take a circuitous looks back at ourselves through the 
(perhaps metaphorical, but with further umwelt-studies, maybe at one point 
empirical and philosophical) eyes of nonhuman animals, and see how this 
would shape our ideas, concepts and conceptions about both ourselves and our 
companion nonhumans. 
 The second paper, The Semiotic Species: Deelying with Animals in Philo-
sophy (Rattasepp, Kull 2016) applies the six points to an analysis of John 
Deely’s concept of the “semiotic animal”, and in addition provides a classifi-
cation of the possible approaches to the semiotic problem of the conditio 
humana of being aware of signs. In this joint paper, the analysis of Deely’s 
thought was provided by the present author, and the classification was provided 
by prof. Kalevi Kull. 
 The third paper, The Anthropological Machine and the Absence of Animals 
(Rattasepp 2014) is an earlier explication of some of the ideas more fully 
developed in the first paper included the present thesis, but puts more focus on 
Giorgio Agamben’s famous concept of the anthropological machine. This is an 
articulation of the human-animal difference, widely prevalent in Western 
thought, which does not place the dividing line at the species border, but within 
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the very constitution of humans themselves, resulting in a conception of the 
human condition as creatures perpetually divided from within. This, too, has 
several consequences, such as the demand for the suppression of the “bestial” in 
humans, and the concomitant expulsion of animals from philosophically rele-
vant thought as anything other than that which must be expelled. 
 The final two papers function as companion pieces to the first three. The 
fourth paper, A Metaphysic for Semiotics (Rattasepp 2013) muses upon certain 
general ideas and conceptions for general semiotic theory which would be 
suitable as premises for thinking about nonhumans. It proposes a sort of non-
hierarchical flat ontology of diverse entities, and a transactional, which is to say 
a constitutive and irreducible concept of relations. And the final paper, Välja-
mõeldiste vadin, reaalsuse vaikus (The Chattering of Fictions, the Silence of 
Reality, Rattasepp 2010) provides a more general historical background of the 
genesis and development of the “two worlds” metaphysics – of the division 
between thinking and being, of which representationalism is the necessary 
consequence – that is at the root of the self-centred philosophies which either 
reject nonhumans, turn them into vessels of human meaning-making, or lend 
credence to them only as long as they are but reflections in the human mirror. 
There are at the end of some of the papers contained within this thesis some 
philosophical-sounding musings about what an animal-centred philosophy 
could look like, taking a few fellow creatures (a mole, a squid) and speculating 
what human philosophy would look from their perspective. They do not consti-
tute any philosophical argument or a coherent claim of any sort. They are more 
akin to fables, snippets of thought, exempla rather than examples. They are 
there, however, to indicate two things. First is to mark down, if only briefly, one 
avenue for further research which the author of this thesis is planning to pursue 
in the near future. For to develop nonhuman ontologies is the very task of the 
semiotic Umwelt-theory, and is one of the paths toward which further research 
in this field should proceed.12 But the second and more important one is that 
they are there to highlight and exemplify one of Derrida’s core messages, which 
on the face of it may sound like a commonplace but which up to very recent 
times was scarcely to be found in philosophy. It is that  
 
it is rather a matter of taking into account a multiplicity of heterogeneous struc-
tures and limits: among nonhumans, and separate from nonhumans, there is an 
immense multiplicity of other living things that cannot in any way be homo-
genized, except by means of violence and willful ignorance, within the cate-
gory of what is called the animal or animality in general. (Derrida 2008: 48) 
 
An exceedingly dominant strand in Western thought, familiar to all, has been 
human exceptionalism: that there is a unique place reserved for humans in the 
world, a place which is to be separated and marked down against all others, 
                                                            
12  Research in animal studies in this direction is also underway, perhaps best exemplified 
by Anna Tsing’s wonderful The Mushroom at the End of the World (2015). See also Despret 
2016 and Kohn 2013. 
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which signifies human transcendence from nature or from the biological order. 
This belief, whether implicitly or explicitly, crops up in many disparate fields, 
often in ones which seemingly have nothing to do with one another. It resides 
deep in the heart of humanism. It is the basis of the conception of culture super-
imposed on nature as a separate, superorganic domain. It is the essence of the 
idea that the essence of “man” is to have no essence. It is the core of that meta-
physics which thinks the transcendental as logically superior to the empirical. It 
lays the foundation to all forms of anthropocentrism. Often, of course, this 
happens unwittingly as an irrelevancy, as we saw at the beginning, when we 
inquired about how philosophers talk about animals when they are not speci-
fically talking about animals. Many more examples could be added. True 
enough, there are numerous contrary strands as well, as well as those which 
ignore these anthropocentrisms in general, such as structuralism with its focus 
to non-individualistic determinants, poststructuralism with its critique of any-
thing static, semiotics with its irreducible relationalities, and the various anti- 
and posthumanisms that herald the erasure of “man” like a face drawn in sand at 
the edge of the sea. But they are beyond the scope of these introductory 
remarks.  
Today, the above are perhaps commonplace observations. It is nevertheless 
relevant to repeat them again, for the narrative of the Ascent of Man is the 
major intellectual source for the present crisis of the Anthropocene. The more 
proper stance today and for a long time now is, to borrow from Derrida again,  
 
to pass beyond man and humanism, the name man being the name of that being 
who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of ontotheology – in other 
words, through the history of all of his history – has dreamed of full presence, 
the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of the game. (Derrida 1970: 
264–265) 
 
Further studies, which will hopefully follow from this thesis, would attempt to 
make good a kind of multispecies semiotics, a comparative ontology of um-
welts, which akin to perspectivism and the ontological turn in anthropology, 
would put philosophical concepts and ideas themselves at risk under the gaze of 
nonhuman animals. Proceeding from a flat ontology of diverse umwelts, such 
studies would inquire into the species-specific nature of human conceptions and 
beliefs, and ask whether new, novel ideas could possibly stem from thinking 
and imagining similar (or different, for that matter) ideas from the perspective 
of a nonhuman animal whose embodiment and umwelt would be different from 
our own. An intensification descriptions of nonhuman umwelts which would 
place our own concepts at risk. But for the time being, if this thesis has any 
overarching message, it is contained in its title: that a necessary step toward 
nonhuman philosophies and modes of thought which would provide their full 
support to and understanding of alterity, and of the full diversity of life on 
Earth, is to refrain from the incessant polishing of the human mirror. Hopefully, 
the rest will follow. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Inimese peegel: filosoofilise loomadiskursuse kriitiline  
analüüs paljuliigilise semiootika positsioonilt 
Käesolevas töös üritatakse avada ja välja tuua teatavat filosoofilist või teoree-
tilist tavakäsitlust või -mõistust loomade ja inimeste vaheliste suhete kujuta-
mises. Eesmärgiks on näidata, et mitmes filosoofilises suunas ja mõnede teiste 
teadusharude üldisemates teoreetilistes käsitlustes on esile toodav teatud kon-
ventsionaalne kujutlus loomade suhetest inimesega, ja et niisugune standard-
kujutlus on levinud. Fookuseks on peamiselt filosoofia selle üldteoreetilises, 
mitte institutsioonilises tähenduses, mis võimaldab töösse haarata rohkemat kui 
tavaliselt filosoofia katustermini all mõeldakse. 
 Töö peamiseks tulemuseks on näidata, et see tavamõistus loomade kujuta-
misel on laialt levinud, ja et see koosneb kuuest eri tahust. Need tahud ei ilmu 
tervikuna mitte igas vaadeldavas tekstis. Eri tekstides võivad selgelt esile tulla 
neist tahkudest vaid mõned, kuid siiski moodustavad need kokku teatava komp-
lekti, mida võib pidada üheks kõige harjumuspärasemaks loomade-inimeste 
suhete kujutamise viisiks, ning olulisemana, et see tavakäsitlus võib omada 
pärssivat rolli elurikkuse, omailmade paljususe ning ka inimese loodusesse 
paigutumise mõistmisel. Seda põhjusel, et need kuus tahku näitavad koos ja 
eraldi, et loomade kujutamise üheks põhiliseks rolliks filosoofias on teiste loo-
made käsitlemise, mõtestamise ja mõistmise väljatõrjumine teatavast arusaama-
de, teemade ja uskumuste sfäärist, mida peetakse ainulaadselt inimomaseks. 
Nende mõttemustrite abil kujutatakse inimest radikaalselt unikaalsena, sageli 
suisa loodusest „väljununa“ ja elavana omaette olemise sfääris, mis on võimalik 
vaid inimestele. Selle tulemusel võivad jääda märkamata need sisulised vas-
tused erinevatele filosoofilistele küsimustele, mida võivad pakkuda teiste liikide 
omailmade – subjektiivsete elumaailmade – sügavam tundmine. 
 Need kuus tahku filosoofilisest tavamõistusest on järgmised: 
 
1. Inimeste ainulaadne loomus tuletatakse ainult inimest ennast uurides, 
mitte võrdlevalt teiste elusolenditega; 
2. Loomade peamiseks üldtunnuseks on, et neil puudub midagi ainuliselt 
inimomast; 
3. Kui inimesi võrreldakse loomadega, kirjeldatakse inimesi nende suhtes 
ainulaadsetena, kui aga teisi loomaliike võrreldakse omavahel, kirjelda-
takse neid vaid üksteisest erinevana liigispetsiifiliste tunnuste põhjal; 
4. Eristus inimeste ja loomade vahel on vaimne, või siis kirjeldatav või taan-
datav vaimsele; 
5. Loomi kirjeldatakse ühe suure ja ühtlase kategooriana, millesse kuuluvad 
kõik loomad tervikuna, liigipõhiseid eristusi ei tehta; 
6. Tõeline inimeseksolemine saavutatakse siis, kui inimesest endast eemal-
dada või välja tõrjuda loomalikkus. 
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Neid kriteeriume, mida arvatakse olevat ainulaadselt inimomased ja mis seetõttu 
puuduvad kõikidel teistel loomadel, võib esile tuua sisuliselt lugematul arvul, 
kuna need on tuletatud eituse kaudu vastavalt tahkudele 2 ja 3. Enamlevinud 
kriteeriumid on keelevõime, kultuurivõime, teadvus või eneseteadvus, ratsio-
naalsus, sümbolikasutus. See ei tähenda, et mõni neist kriteeriumeist ei võiks 
olla ainulaadselt inimomane, kuid niisugused võrdlused on teaduslikult võimali-
kud vaid liigipõhiselt. Töö rõhuasetuseks on aga, et loobuda niisugusest filosoo-
filisest tavamõistusest, mille tagajärjeks on teiste loomade väljatõrjumine, võiks 
olla viljakas nii mõnelegi probleemile uudse lahenduse pakkumiseks, mille tõttu 
zoo- ja biosemiootikal oleks tulus teha vastastikust koostööd paljude teiste 
humanitaaria ning sotsiaalteaduste valdkondadega ja eriti filosoofiavallaga. 
 Mõistagi ei saa seda „tavamõistust“ liialdatult üldistada. Täpsemalt, on näi-
datav, et eeltoodu käib peamiselt humanismi pärandiga mõttesuundade kohta, 
milles antropotsentriline mõtlemine on kesksel kohal. Sellest johtuvalt esita-
takse töös vastukaaluks posthumanistlik mõtteviis, mille eesmärgiks on mõista 
inimeseksolemist sängitatuna paljudesse erinevatesse protsessidesse ning näha 
inimest haaratuna tervesse semiootilisse suhtevõrku, mis tema olukorda tingivad 
ja mida ta ise tingib vastu. Zoo- ja biosemiootika, mis rõhutavad kogu elusa 
kommunikatiivset iseloomu ning uurivad teiste elusolendite omailmu, on selle 
poolest oma sisult filosoofias ja humanitaarias laiemalt levinud „posthumanis-
mile“ lähedased valdkonnad. 
 Töös kasutatakse läbivalt mitmeid mõisteid ja kontseptsioone, mis kerkivad 
eri artiklites ikka ja jälle üles. Kaks kesksemat neist on korrelatsionism ja antro-
poloogiline masin. Esimene on (humanistliku pärandiga) filosoofiale omane 
mõtteviis, mille järgi teadmisteooria saab tegeleda vaid ühe spetsiifilise suhtega, 
nimelt mõtlemise ja olemise vahelisega, ega mitte kummagi poolega eraldi. 
Mõelda tähendab mõelda korrelatsioonist maailma ja teadvuse, keele ja osutatu 
jne vahel. Korrelatsionism on aga ebasümmeetriline: inimmõistus või –kultuur 
omab suhtes konstitueerivat rolli, täites maailma tähendusega. Sellest johtuvalt 
pöörab korrelatsionistlik mõte vähem tähelepanu maailmale ja ka seal leiduva-
tele teisele olenditele, kuna inimliku poole tähendust konstrueeriv roll on tõste-
tud tähtsamale kohale. Korrelatsionistlik mõte toetab humanistlikku filosoofiat 
ja selle tõrjuvat hoiakut kõige mitteinimliku suhtes. 
 Giorgio Agambeni mõiste antropoloogiline masin käib peamiselt ülaltoodud 
kuuenda punkti kohta. Läbi lääne mõtte ajaloo on inimest regulaarselt kujutatud 
justkui kahetise olendina, kes kuulub osalt loodusesse, osalt on aga sealt välju-
nud (kas siis „väljunud“ eraldisse kultuurimaailma või siis on tema teadvus või 
mõtlemine maailmast mingis tähenduses eraldiseisev). Loomalikku poolt aga on 
tavapäraselt peetud madalamaks, mistõttu „tõelise“ inimloomuse saavutamiseks 
tuleb see maha suruda või välja juurida. Lisaks filosoofilistele probleemidele on 
sellel arusaamal olnud mitmeid traagilisi tagajärgi ka poliitikavallas ja ühis-
kondliku elu korraldamises.  
 Käesoleva töö artikkel I, The philosophical discourse on animals, and the 
philosophical animals themselves („Filosoofiline diskursus loomadest ja filo-
soofilised loomad ise“) on töö jaoks keskne ning harutab pikemalt lahti ülal-
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toodud kuus tahku inimeste ja loomade suhete kirjeldamises. Edasi lahatakse 
mõningaid tagajärgi sellest enesekohasest inimese isoleerimisest vaid tema enda 
kirjeldatud ja temast endast tuletatud kujutlusest inimloomuse kohta. Lõpuks 
üritatakse näidata, mismoodi võiks välja näha omamoodi tagasipilk inimese 
mõtlemisele teiste elusolendite vaatepunktilt, ning arutada, kuidas see mõjutaks 
meie ideid, arusaamu ja mõisteid nii meist endist kui meie kaaslastest, teistest 
elusolenditest. 
 II artikkel, The Semiotic Species: Deelying with Animals in Philosophy 
(„Semiootiline liik: Loomad John Deely filosoofias“) rakendab ülaltoodud kuut 
tahku John Deely „semiootilise looma“ mõistele, uurimaks, kas ja kuivõrd 
kirjeldatud filosoofiline tavamõistus tuleb esile John Deely kui ühe semiootika 
jaoks keskse autori vastavasisulistes töödes. Näidatakse, et ka Deely järgib osa-
liselt seda mustrit, kuid toob välja eripäraseid tahke, mis asetavad inimesed 
kommunikatiivselt sügavalt eluilma sisse. Lisaks tuuakse ära klassifikatsioon 
võimalikest lähenemistest semiootilisele probleemile conditio humanast kui 
olendist, kes on teadlik märkidest. 
 III artikkel, The Anthropological Machine and the Absence of Animals 
(„Antropoloogiline masin ja loomade puudumine“) keskendub peaasjalikult 
juba nimetatud antropoloogilise masina mõistele, ning arutleb tagajärgede üle, 
mis tulenevad inimese-looma vahelise piiri paigutamisest mitte liigipiirile, vaid 
inimesse endasse. See on viinud erinevatesse katsetesse inimese loomalikku 
pärandit alla suruda. Antropoloogilise masina mõiste on peamisi, mis on põh-
justanud kuni loomaeetika tekkimiseni vähese eetilise tähelepanu muudele elus-
olenditele. 
 Viimased kaks artiklit on laiemaks taustaks esimese kolme spetsiifilisemale 
fookusele. IV artikkel A Metaphysic for Semiotics („Üks semiootika metafüüsi-
kaid“) arutab teatavate üldiste kontseptsioonide üle semiootika üldteoorias, mis 
sobiksid alusteks mitteinimeste uurimise tarbeks. Käiakse välja eri entiteetidest 
koosnev mittehierarhiline „lameontoloogia“ kontseptsioon, ning „transaktsioo-
niline“ käsitlus suhetest, mis näeb relatsioone konstitueerivate ja taandamatu-
tena. V artikkel, Väljamõeldiste vadin, reaalsuse vaikus annab laiema ajaloo-
lise tausta nn „kahe maailma“ metafüüsika tekkest ja arengust, nimelt moder-
nistlikust arusaamast, mille järgi on võimalik ette otsustada, kas mõni nähtus 
kuulub maailma või mõtte, looduse või kultuuri valda, millise otsuse tagajärjel 
kirjeldatakse neid kaht olemise sfääri eraldiseisvate ja lahutatutena. See huma-
nistlik mõttesuund filosoofias on kõige kaalukam põhjus, miks mitteinimesi (nii 
asju kui teisi loomi) võetakse filosoofias arutellu vaid siis kui nad on esitatud 
inimese representatsioonidena, aga mitte iseseisvate ja iseväärsete entiteetide ja 
elusolenditega tihedalt põimitud maailmas. 
 Positiivse programmina käiakse töös välja ka võimalus analüüsida muid liike 
sarnaselt antropoloogias leviva „ontoloogilise pöörde“ vaimus, mille ees-
märgiks on omamoodi tagasipilk, kus fundamentaalsed mõisted pannakse teiste 
kultuuride või kollektiivide kujutluste, uskumuste ja arusaamade kriitilise 
ümbermõtestamise alla ning selle abil näidatakse mõistete partikulaarset, aja-
loolist või kehastunud loomust. Tulevaste uuringute jaoks käiakse välja võima-
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lus teha sarnast zoosemiootikas teiste liikide abil, kus inimese omast erinevad 
omailmad võiksid olla kõnekad inimomaste arusaamade kriitilisel mõistmisel ja 
lahtiharutamisel. 
 Mitmes artiklis esitatakse eelneva illustreerimiseks mõned spekulatiivsed 
lühianalüüsid või pigem kommentaarid, milline võiks olla „filosoofia loomade 
pilgu läbi“. Võetakse mõned näited (mutt, kaheksajalg, lehtritsikas) ning näida-
takse, mismoodi võiks nende abil mõelda probleemidest nagu nt materiaalsus, 
probleemilahendamine, teadvus jne. Antropotseeni ajastul on sellest tulenev 
arusaam inimeste sügavast osalusest kogu elumaailmas olulise tähtsusega. 
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